THEISM AND ELVIS SPACE ALIENS

[Anonymous]

>Consider the following variation on the Great Pumpkin objection.
>> <snip>
>It seems to me that there are no good arguments against the existence of
>space aliens of this sort (except for the obvious one: there is no reason
>to think they *do* exist, but this is not an objection against a basic
>belief). Furthermore, if it turns out to be true that there are aliens of
>this kind, my belief is not only basic, but a case of knowledge.
>
>Does anyone else here think this is a crazy conclusion?

[Sudduth]

Well, a few things need to be said here.

(1) The parity argument in *God and Other Minds* concludes by way of modus
ponens that (basic) belief in God is rational, and this by way of the
premises (i) belief in other minds is rational and (ii) if belief in other
minds is rational, then belief in God is rational. However, (ii) is in fact
supported by an argument concerning the similarity of dialectical structure
between theistic arguments and arguments for other minds. As Plantinga puts
it:"the objections to belief in other minds don't seem at all formible, but
unhappily there also aren't any good arguments for other minds. . . .the
strongest argument for the existence of God and the strongest argument for
other minds are similar and that they fail in similar ways" (*Warranted
Christian Belief,* pp. 69-70). It is on the basis of this premise that
Plantinga argues for the conditional claim <if my belief in other minds is
rational, then my belief in God is rational.>

Now you seem to want to argue that if one asserts

[A] <If belief in other minds is rational, then belief in God is rational>

then one could or should also conclude or concede that

[B] <If belief in God is rational, then belief in Elvis space-aliens is
rational>.

And hence, one should be able to deduce, by way of a second modus ponens
argument, that

[C] Belief in Elvis space-aliens is rational.

(If my belief in God is rational, then, given [B], belief in Elvis
space-aliens is rational).

Unfortunately, the immediate problem with deducing [C] by way of modus
ponens is that there would have to be an argument for [B]. But why suppose
that [B] is true? Plantinga presents arguments (most of *God and Other
Minds*) to show that [A] is true. But [B] isn't obviously entailed by [A].
One would have to argue that the arguments *for* and *against* Gaffit
space-aliens have a similar dialectical structure as arguments for and
against belief in God. Perhaps this *can* be done, but until it is I see no
reason why one should infer [B] from [A], or maintain [B] or any variant
thereof at all. You say, "It seems to me that there are no good arguments
against the existence of space aliens of this sort (except for the obvious
one: there is no reason to think they *do* exist, but this is not an
objection against a basic belief)." But this is only part of the issue. Is
there similarity of dialectical structure with respect to arguments *for*
Elvis space-aliens in relation to arguments for belief in God (or other
minds)? This is the crucial question.

So as I see it, a crucial premise is missing in the argument. One need not
conclude that belief in Elvis space-aliens is rational just because of the
parity argument regarding God and other minds.

(2) But quite independent of (1), it is crucial to get clear on the sense in
which space-alien beliefs of the sort you mention can be *rational.* It is
not enough to speak of beliefs being properly basic. Properly basic with
respect to what? Here it is important to distinguish between internal and
external rationality (and ultimately between rationality and warrant).

The space-alien belief in question could easily be properly basic with
respect to internal or deontological rationality. The latter is simply a
matter of being within one's intellectual rights in holding a belief. The
former notion Plantinga describes as the proper functioning of one's
cognitive faculties "downstream" from experience, where this includes
holding the appropriate sort of belief in response to one's experience
(broadly taken), coherence, and the like - where these in one way or
another relate to the believer's viewpoint of the world, taken as an
internally accessible matter. For example, given that I am appeared to
Elvis-in-the-roomly, the internally rational thing to do is hold the belief
that Elvis is in the room. Internal rationality may also be taken to include
deontological rationality. (For more on these distinctions, see *Warranted
Christian Belief,* pp. 110-113)

As Plantinga now concedes, nearly anything can be believed with
deontological rationality. (Cf. his comments on voodooists in *WCB,* p.
346). Although the person you describe might be violating his epistemic
duties, it isn't clear that he must be. At any rate, one could describe the
situation in such a way that he is not.

External rationality, on the other hand, has to do with proper function
"upstream" from experience, i.e., proper function with respect to the
formation of sensuous experience and formation of the right sort of doxastic
experience. (See *WCB,* p. 112). Perhaps I suffer from a cognitive disorder,
local presleyania persona syndrome, which randomly causes me to be appeared
to Elvis-in-the-roomly. As stated above, given that I have this sort
of experience, I am internally rational to believe that Elvis is in the
building, but the experience itself is the product of cognitive disorder, so
my Elvis belief is not externally rational.

Whether a belief is externally rational depends on the human cognitive
design plan, and this is highly sensitive to our actual truth-aimed
cognitive mechanisms, faculties, or belief forming processes. And this runs
into distinctly metaphysical issues. I see no reason why Plantinga ought to
concede to the external rationality of space alien beliefs just because he
affirms the external rationality of basic theistic beliefs. Clearly, in your
example, the space-alien belief is not produced by any known truth-aimed
cognitive processes (e.g., it does not come from sense experience or logical
inference), nor does theism lead us to expect any special mechanism for the
formation of such beliefs.

So Plantinga can concede that space-alien beliefs are deontologically and
internally rational (at least for some people) but deny that such beliefs
are basic with respect to either external rationality or warrant.

(3) As far as Plantinga's position goes, it is incorrect to say that the
properly basic belief in your example, if true, would constitute knowledge.
First, internally rational beliefs that are true do not constitute
knowledge, and deontological rationality is not even a necessary
condition for knowledge according to Plantinga. Secondly, even a true
proper function or externally rational belief is not knowledge. What is
required is (a sufficient amount of) warrant, and this includes more than
internal and external proper function. It also includes the proper
functioning of one's cognitive faculties according to a design plan
successfully aimed at truth and in the right sort of (mini) cognitive
environment. When these stipulations are added in it becomes clear that
whether a belief like the one in your example has warrant will depend on the
design plan, and this will depend on distinctly metaphysical issues.

Now, one might argue that if Elvis space-alien beliefs are true, then they
are (likely) warranted (as Plantinga tries to with respect to theistic
belief). But in that case one would have to present a model of (basic)
space-alien belief formation and show that such a model is likely given some
particular metaphysical thesis. I don't think any such model would be likely
given the truth of theism. As I said above, I don't see that the truth of
theism renders it likely that humans would have a special mechanism (akin to
the sensus divinitatis) that would be responsible for the formation of the
space alien belief. But a theistic belief forming process or mechanism does
seem likely if theism is true. Also, it does not appear that the space-alien
belief is the product of any of our other standard cognitive modules,
mechanisms, or processes. So one cannot extrapolate space-alien beliefs from
any model based on known cognitive processes. So I think you would need to
generate a metaphysical story that is such that, given the truth of that
story, it is likely that humans have a special space-alien belief producing
mechanism that meets the specifications of warrant.

The crucial point, I should think, is that Plantinga is not committed to
maintaining that Elvis space-alien beliefs are warrant basic just because
theistic belief is. The warrant enjoyed by theistic belief is based on the
truth of theism. It is hard to see how the warrant of space-alien beliefs
can be based on the truth of theism. And since it does not seem to be
included in or derivable from the stock of known cognitive processes, what
reason does the theist have for regarding such a belief as warrant basic?

(4) A final point. Plantinga can also concede that a person is within her
intellectual rights or internally rational in claiming or believing that
space-alien beliefs are properly basic with respect to rationality
(deontological, internal, or external) or warrant. But he can quite sensibly
deny that such second-order epistemic beliefs are either true or warranted.
(See *WCB*, pp. 344-351). Of course to *argue* that these epistemically
queer beliefs are not warranted he might have to provide reasons for
supposing that theistic belief is warranted, but, given his own position,
the only such reasons I can think of are reasons for supposing that theism
is true.

Hence, much like the father of the prodigal son, the Reformed epistemologist
must call for fatted calf and celebrate. Natural theology, though once dead,
is given life alive; it was lost and is now found.

Hope this helps. May the King be with you. J

Peace,
Michael