There is an apparent tension between two historically prevalent Christian beliefs. Many Christians have believed that God is absolutely immutable, that nothing about the divine essence does in fact change or could change. Accordingly, an immutable God has an unchanging and unchangeable will. On the other hand, Christians of all varieties have held to the practice of petitionary prayer--the making of requests of God--behind which lies the belief that prayer has some causal significance. This belief in the efficacy of prayer is supported by, and no doubt gains its place of fundamental importance in the Christian tradition from, the Old and New Testament Scriptures, the most casual reading of which turns up a plethora of instances of requests being made to God and God hearing and answering such requests. But if for everything that God brings about in the world, his bringing it about is grounded in his unchanging will, can we plausibly maintain that God, in any real sense, answers prayers?

In the present paper I want to argue that the immutability of the divine will is compatible with petitionary prayer, that whatever God wills to be brought about in the world is eternal and unchanging, but that God nonetheless brings about many things in the world because of, or as a result of, prayers offered to Him by individuals. More specifically, I will argue for this compatibility thesis on the basis of the traditional argument from the efficacy of secondary causality (found, for instance, in Thomas Aquinas) though I shall contend that the traditional account can be strengthened by the notion of "complex intention" recently discussed by Paul Helm.

I take my starting-point to be a statement of the propositions at issue.

(1)If God brings about anything, then God has unchangingly willed to bring it about.

(2) God answers prayer if and only if God brings about some things because individuals have asked God to bring them about.

The question now arises as to the compatibility of (1) and (2). Does is make sense to say that God immutably wills to brings about something and yet he brings it about because an individual makes a certain request of him? It would seem that (1) and (2) are not compatible. If the divine will is immutable, then there can be no alteration of God's will by anything on the part of the creature. Nothing a person requests of God will make a difference in God. No prayer can change God's mind regarding what he has determined to bring about. And if one adopts a particularly stringent conception of immutability, that it is logically impossible for anything about the divine nature to change, the problem is compounded. How, then, can prayer have any causal significance? Any request made to God in prayer would, if answered, require God's bringing something about as a result of the individual's prayer. But God has already determined what things he will bring about and that determination is fixed. To be more precise, we can set up the difficulty with the following set of propositions:

(3) S prays at time t1 for God to bring about X.

(4) God immutably wills (either timelessly or before t1) that X come about at time t2.

(5) God brings about X at time t2 because S prays at time t1 for X.

It doesn't appear that (5) follows from (3) and (4). At this point we can introduce a point made by Peter Geach. He considers the two propositions: (i) the father was going to give the boy a pony for his birthday whatever the boy asked for or didn't ask for and (ii) the father gave the boy a pony because he asked for one. Applied to God and prayer, we would get something like a distinction between (A) God was going to bring about X relative to person S's petition whatever S asked for or didn't ask for, and (B) God brought about X because S asked for X. But it doesn't seem that (B) is true if (A) is true (and conversely), for consider: if (B) is true, then it certainly seems to be the case that if S had not asked for X, or had asked for something different, then God would not have brought about X. But this is obviously incompatible with the claim in (A), for according to that formulation what God brings about is entirely independent of what S prays for. True, it might happen that S prays for X (as it might happen that the boy ends up asking for a pony), and X is what God has already determined to bring about, so (3) is compatible with (4). But the point is that (4) is also compatible with

(6) S does not pray at time t1 for X.

And this is why the conjunction of (3) and (4) does not entail (5), for what is needed for that is the negation of (6). In other terms:

(7) God brings about something because S prayed for it only if God would not have brought it about had S not prayed for it.

So it appears that what is needed to establish the compatibility of divine immutability and petitionary prayer is something like the conjunction of (3), (4), (5), and (7). But is this possible given condition (7) and the immutability of the divine will articulated in (4)?


II. SECONDARY CAUSATION AND THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER

The need to maintain simultaneously the immutability of God's decree and the causal efficacy of the actions of human agents has had a long tradition in Christian theology. Classical theologians have traditionally resorted to the distinction between primary and secondary causes to achieve this goal. The Protestant scholastic Jerome Zanchius explains: "In Consequence of God's immutable will and infallible foreknowledge, whatever things come to pass, come to pass necessarily, though with respect to second causes and us men, many things are contingent. . ." (Absolute Predestination, The Will of God, position 11). In the Westminster Confession we read: "God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established" (III.i). In his Summa theologiae (2a2ae 83.2), Thomas Aquinas is careful to avoid the two extremes of (a) affirming the necessity of human actions and (b) making the decree of providence mutable. Some, Aquinas tells us, holding that all things come about by necessity (whether physical necessity or the immutability of God's decree), deny the usefulness of prayer; while others, affirming the usefulness of prayer and that human actions are ruled by providence (though without necessity), make the divine decree variable. Aquinas emphasizes the importance of affirming human acts as true causes, while retaining the immutability of the divine will as expressed in the decree of providence. His position leads him to maintain that providence disposes both effects and the manner in which they will be brought about.

Human acts are true causes, and therefore men must perform certain actions, not in order to change divine providence, but in order to obtain certain effects in the manner determined by God. What is true of natural causes is true also of prayer, for we do not pray in order to change the decree of divine providence, rather we pray in order to impetrate those things which God has determined would be obtained only through our prayers. In other words, men pray that by asking they might deserve to receive what God Almighty decreed to give them from all eternity, as Gregory says.

Human agents, as secondary causes, can be seen to genuinely act even where their acting is something that is willed by God. Cajetan explained this by saying that man causes the result of prayer, but he does so, not as the principal efficient cause, but as an efficient dispositive cause. So if God wills to bring about X, he may do so by willing that X be brought about by some person S's action, where this action is the act of prayer. And in this, the agent S does actually bring about X. It is not to say that God couldn't have willed to bring X about without S's agency, only that God can will to bring about (some) things such that human agents are involved in the causal process. We may explicate the causal relations involved here technically by pointing out that bringing-about relations are both transitive and preserve the efficacy of the proximate agent. If Jim decides to have his house painted by hiring two of his friends to do the job, we can say that Jim brings it about that his friends bring it about that Jim's house is painted. It follows, though, from the italicized clause that Jim brings it about that Jim's house is painted. Jim himself is involved in the causal process. But the transitive relation notwithstanding, it is also true that, if Jim brings it about that his friends bring it about that Jim's house is painted, that Jim's friends bring it about that Jim's house is painted. Applied to divine willings and prayer we get the following principle:

(8) If God brings it about that some person S brings about X by some P-action (prayer), then S brings about X by some P-action.

So, we get:

(9) God (as remote cause) brings about X.

(10) S (as proximate cause) brings about X.

William Mann has suggested that the preceding account is also compatible with human agents having the power, at the appropriate time, genuinely to act otherwise. It might be thought that if S freely brings about X at t, then S has the power at t to refrain from bringing it about that X at t. Moreover, if at t God immutably wills that X and that S bringing it about that X, it seems that S did not have it in S's power at t to refrain from bringing it about that X. But does this second claim follow? Given that (i) God immutably wills that S bring it about that X and also that (ii) God immutably wills that S have the power to refrain from bringing it about that X, two things follow: (iii) S brings it about that X and (iv) S does not exercise the power that S has to refrain from bringing it about that X. Neither (i) nor (ii) entail the further propositions: (v) Necessarily, S brings it about that X, and (vi) Necessarily, S does not exercise the power S has to refrain from bringing it about that X. Such an entailment would require (i) and (ii) to be prefixed with the appropriate modal operator, such that: (vii) [Necessarily (i)] and (viii) [Necessarily (ii)]. But one need not affirm the very strong theses (vii) and (viii).

Now David Basinger in "Why Petition an Omnipotent, Omniscient, Wholly Good God?" (Religious Studies, 19, pp. 25-41) distinguishes between two forms of causal efficacy vis-a-vis petitionary prayer:

(11) A petitionary prayer is efficacious if and only if God sometimes brings about certain states of affairs just because he has been petitioned to do so.

(12) A petitionary prayer is efficacious if and only if the prayer either (a) benefits the petitioner or (b) is a causal component used by God to bring about his desired ends.

Basinger takes (12) to represent the classical theist position. However, he quickly points out that, from the vantage point of the ordinary theist, it is an insufficient thesis, for in the Christian canon "numerous situations are cited in which individuals seemingly influenced the course of events by their prayers." Basinger emphasizes that the type of causal efficacy ordinary theists take themselves to posses with respect to (at least some of) their prayers requires something like (11): God sometimes brings about certain states of affairs just because he has been petitioned to do so. One who holds this form of the causal efficacy of prayer believes that "God at times performs certain actions which he would not have performed if he had not been petitioned to do so." And this position he contrasts with the traditional argument from secondary causality stated in (12). Basinger has drawn attention to a point similar to that raised by Geach. The causal efficacy of prayer requires (5), and (5) in turn requires (7), for what is fundamentally needed is the notion that if S had not prayed for X, X would not have come about. Basinger thinks that the traditional account from secondary causality does not adequately establish these desired theses. However, I believe that there is more which can be said about the traditional account than has been conceded by its critics.

What I wish to argue is that the conjunction of (8), (9), and (10) entails (5), and since (5) entails (7), Basinger's distinction between (11) and (12) breaks down. There is nothing in (12) that cannot be deduced from an adequate understanding of (b) in (11). Two basic moves are required to see this. First, we take the divine will as an intention to bring about certain states of affairs. Secondly, we distinguish between simple and complex intentions. Paul Helm (in "Omnipotence and Change," Philosophy, 1976) brings out the distinction as follows:

(A) Jones intends [A to come to pass as a result of being asked to bring A to pass]

(B) As a result of being asked to do A, Jones intends [A to come to pass].

So, where above we had

(4) God immutably wills that X come about at time t2,

we now more accurately can say:

(13) God immutably wills that [X comes to pass at time t2 as a result of being asked by S at time t1 to bring A to pass].

Peter Geach, though, is primarily concerned, not just with what God intends but with what he says. And this might appear to raise difficulties for the present account, for given that there are situations in the biblical record where God apparently gives conditional intentions which are in conflict with unconditional intentions, we would seem to need a way to sort this out. Consider the case (cited by Geach) where God says "Hezekiah will not recover" and yet later says "Hezekiah will recover." If God does not have two intentions (one antecedent to and one consequent upon the actions of men), we must read such statements as somehow involving one complex intention. But the question is how an unconditional intention (the recovery of Hezekiah) and a conditional intention (the death of Hezekiah, should prayer not be made for His recovery) can be parts of one indivisible divine intention? Helm thinks that we need to understand an utterance such as "Hezekiah will not recover" as occurring within a framework of conditions and promises, and under the appropriate circumstances having the force of a warning or threat. We could, then, say that God's complex intention is: God intends [Hezekiah's recovery to come to pass having expressly indicated that his death will occur if his recovery is not requested, knowing that in fact his recovery will be requested], which is of course not to be confused with: God intends [Hezekiah's recovery only when requested to bring it about having previously indicated that Hezekiah's death will occur]. Now, in addition to requiring us to analyze certain categorical statements as conditional, this move will also commit us to a doctrine of divine foreknowledge, for God must--on this way of looking at things--know beforehand what the actions of human agents will be vis-a-vis the issuing of divine warnings. The complex intention thesis allows us to substitute something like (i) God wills that Hezekiah should not recover unless prayer is offered for his recovery for (ii) God wills that Hezekiah should not recover, and something like (iii) God wills that Hezekiah should recover on account of the foreknown prayer of certain individuals for (vi) God wills that Hezekiah should recover. (i) and (iii) are clearly not opposed as are (ii) and (iv). So complex intentions may be construed in such a way so as to include difficult cases as these to which Geach draws attention.

Hence, what we have established is:

(14) God as remote cause brings it about that S brings about X,

from which follows (9) by the transitivity relation and (10) by the principle of the preservation of the efficacy of proximate cause. Moreover,

(6) S does not pray at time t1 for X.

is ruled out and

(7) God brings about something because S prayed for it only if God would not have brought it about had S not prayed for it.

can be affirmed, for X will not come about if S does not pray for X. If (13) is true, (6) is false. Given that God brings it about that S brings about X, then God brings it about that "S" brings about X, and it is not possible for God to bring "this" about without S bringing X about. We thereby block the inference from immutability to God's bringing something about regardless of what S prays for--the crucial point in both Geach and Basinger.

Helm summarizes the present points as follows:

"God who ordained certain ends, also ordained the means to accomplish those ends. Now in some cases, in God's wisdom, the means include people warrantably asking him to do certain things. He has so ordered the total matrix that he does because people ask him to, and, if they has not asked, the conditions which are otherwise sufficient--apart, that is, from the request--for the production of what is asked for would not have been provided."

So by chisholming (8) we get:

(15) If God brings it about that some person S brings about X by some P-action (prayer), then S brings about X by some P-action, and if S does not engage in P-action, then X would not have come about.

Hence, if we assume the theory of complex divine intention and explicitly formulate the traditional account of secondary causality in terms of this theory, we can show that the conjunction of (8), (9), and (10) entails (5). And since (5) entails (7), the original conjunction has (15) as one of its corollaries.

What the arguments gives us, then, is: the immutability of God's will, his bringing about (as ultimate cause) things prayed for by human agents, and these things being brought about (through secondary causation) because human agents pray for them, and (by virtue of taking the divine will as a complex intention) if S had not prayed for them they would not have come to pass. The account also suggests that even if prayer does not change God, it does influence and effect change within God's providential order--not in relation to the decree of the order itself but with respect to its actual execution. As the Calvinist Stephen Charnocke states: "The decree itself was eternal and immutable, but the thing decreed was temporary and mutable. As a decree from eternity doth not make the thing decreed to be eternal, so neither doth immutability of the decree render the thing so decreed to be immutable" (The Existence and Attributes of God, 1682, p. 207). So we are not strained in the least to say that God's will is immutable and God answers prayer.

What the account does not provide for is the notion that God in some way responds to our prayers--a popular view. I have intentionally avoided this expression and chosen to focus on the notion of causality, as I believe that that is the more crucial issue to the compatibility of divine immutability and petitionary prayer. The present account also does not entail that what is being prayed for is in any way "present in its causes" (something which Geach and others rightfully see as incompatible with petitionary prayer). That would require the account to entail that there is, independent of some agent's prayer, a set of causally sufficient conditions for the bringing about of what the agent prays for. What has been stressed in this paper is that there is a set of necessary conditions, which together with petitionary prayer is possibly sufficient, for the bringing about of some state of affairs.

Whatever the psychological quirks about God not responding to prayers or human agents not being able to put the screws on God by their entreaties, the logic of the position I believe is such that there is no incompatibility between the efficacy of petitionary prayer and the immutability of the divine will. And this conclusion is not so far removed from a premise well-known in the Christian tradition: "If we ask anything according to his will, he hears us. And if we know that he hears us, whatsoever we ask, we know that we have the petitions that we have desired of him." (John 5:14, 15). At the end of the day, the point of prayer is, not to change God, but to change us--to bring us to daily acknowledge God as our sovereign Creator, our need of Him as the source of life and goodness, and as the One who works all things after the council of His own will.