There are, in contemporary thought, two ways of approaching "thought about God."

On one side there are those who work within the apriorist, Anselmian tradition which begins with a purportedly self-evident conception of God as THE GREATESR POSSIBLE BEING. On the other side, there are those who work within an a posteriori, empirical, and experimental mode of developing thought about God. The a posteriorists generally take as their starting-point and touchstone for truth either the data of experience or biblical revelation. This dichotomy has often led to a dichotomy between the God of the philosophers and the God of revelation. But many who are attracted to the Anselmian model, nevertheless want take seriously the empirical phenomenon of religion. They seek to break down the dichotomy. They want to argue that "the God of Anselm is the God of the patriarchs." It is rational to suppose that these two different ways of thinking about God can converge. Morris, in particular, holds that there is a strong case to the effect that the only adequate way of developing either of the two competing traditions is by drawing on the other.

The Anselmian conception of God is the conception of the greatest possible being--the maximally perfect being. God, under this view, exemplifies necessarily a maximally perfect set of compossible great-making properties, where a great making property is understood to be a property the possession of which is intrinsically better than the lacking of it. Traditionally, this conception of God has included such properties as omniscience, omnipotence, immutability, eternality, and impeccability. All the divine attributes are unified under the single notion of "Maximal perfection".

A. Modality of Necessity (De Dicto, De Re, & Nec. existence.)

Classical theism holds that God is omniscient, omnipotent, wholly good, etc.

(1) God is omniscient.

(2) God is omnipotent.

(3) God is good.

But the claim of classical theism is actually stronger that (1)-(3) relative to the attributes predicated of God. Christians have wanted to say that God is necessarily omniscient, omnipotent, and good. Hence, they have wanted to say something like:

(1a) Necessarily, God is omniscient.

(2a) Necessarily, God is omnipotent.

(3a) Necessarily, God is good.

(1a)-(3a) are claims of de dicto necessity. This is a conceptual necessity or a propositional necessity resulting from the unpacking of the concept of God. The necessity of God's possessing whatever attributes he does de dicto simply refers to the impossibility of any individual counting as God that does not possess that attribute.

But there is another way to construe what is meant by God is necessarily good, etc. The necessities may be construed de re.

(1b) God is necessarily omniscient.

(2b) God is necessarily omnipotent.

(3b) God is necessarily good.

In each one of these cases the necessity involved is true of an individual who in fact is God and is the expression of one of his ESSENTIAL attributes--a property without which he could not exist. Any individual who is God has that status essentially. An essential property of God will be one he possesses in every possible world in which he exists. De re necessity, then, involves attributes possessed by a thing in every possible world in which it exists. Hence, any individual who is God is God in every possible world in which he exists.

But some theists have wanted to maintain also that the individual who is God exists in every possible world. He is NECESSARILY EXISTENT--he exists in every possible world and his non-existence is metaphysically impossible.

B. Other Modalities

Contrasted:

A property that is immemorial, enduring, or immutable is not necessarily essential. "This is because a property which is such that an individual in fact exemplifies it in a stable manner might be such that that its bearer could have existed without ever having it all. However, there is a sense in which a property which is essential for its bearer is thereby immutable, and thus both enduring and immemorial for that individual" (Morris, Anselmian Explorations, p. 78).

Further distinctions:

We can also distinguish between a weak and strong sense of a property being immutable, enduring, and immemorial.