What is middle knowledge?

What are its problems?

Can God know counterfactuals of freedom?

How does God maintain control over human history, especially with reference to free actions of people?

Historical responses:

Dominicans: God controls human history by causally determining human actions.

Jesuits: God controls history by causing circumstances in which he knew that human agents would freely act in accordance with his plans. This is the position taken up by Luis de Molina and Francisco Suarez. It requires that God have middle knowledge.

Types of Divine knowledge:

(1) Natural knowledge: God's knowledge of the possible, or God's knowledge of himself and all necessary truths (which follow from the divine nature).

(2) Free knowledge: God's knowledge of the actual, or God's knowledge of his own (free) will and everything causally determined by his freely willing to bring it about--all contingent reality.

(3) Middle Knowledge: God knows with certainty what every possible free creature would freely do in every situation in which that creature could possibly find himself.1

[More technically, God's knowledge of what actual free creatures would do if placed in certain circumstances, circumstances which are not realized and will not be realized; and how non-actualized beings would choose if actualized and placed in certain circumstances.]

Middle knowledge requires that God know all sorts of counterfactuals of freedom.

(a) Counterfactual: a counterfactual is a conditional proposition of which it is assumed that the antecedent is false: if p then q, but it is implied (by the form of the conditional) that p did not (or would not) occur. E.g., [if I had dropped the glass, it would have broken] or [if I were to go to London tomorrow, I would be late for class].

(b) Counterfactual of freedom: a counterfactual of freedom is a counterfactual in which the consequent is a statement about a free action, of the general form [if God had placed S in circumstance C, S would have done A freely].

Traditional cases of middle knowledge:

[A] If David stayed in Keilah, Saul would besiege the city.

[B] If David stayed in Keilah and Saul besieged the city, the men of Keilah would surrender David to Saul.

On the picture of middle knowledge possessed by a temporal being, God knows all conditionals of human freedom beforehand--before he chooses to create the world and the things in it. Knowing all counterfactuals of freedom, God decides to create one set of circumstances (as opposed to another), knowing that individuals placed in those circumstances would (will) do a certain action freely. [So from a initial set of conditionals, many will become counterfactuals (since they will never be actualised].

Premise 1: If God has middle knowledge, then there are truths about matterrs expressed by counterfactuals of freedom (i.e., truths about what S would have done if placed in circumstance C).#2

[2Premise 1 follows from the definition of knowledge which states that truth is a necessary condition for knowledge. If the object of middle knowledge is a counterfactual of freedom, counterfactuals of freedom must be true, because truth is a necessary condition for knowledge.]

Premise 2: There are no truths about matters expressed by counterfactuals of freedom.

Conclusion: Therefore, God does not have middle knowledge.

Premise 2 may be supported by the following considerations:

(1) Middle knowledge not simple foreknowledge which would be rendered true by the occurrence of an event or action stated categorically, e.g., [he will come down] or [he will surrender you]. All categorical predictions can be true by corresponding to the actual occurrence of the event they predict. But in [A] and [B], there never was nor will be an actual besieging of Keilah by Saul, nor an actual betrayal of David by Saul, and these would be the precise events to the counterfactuals of freedom might correspond.

So, take [if S goes to London, S will do X freely]. This is made true by what happens when in fact S goes to London. But if we suppose a conditional in which (a) the antecedent is false and (b) the conditional is about someone and/or circumstances which do not exist (and will not exist), we are left with a very different scenario. The person cannot make the conditional true, for the person does not and will not exist. The circumstance C cannot make the conditional true for the very same reasons. If God exists, even he cannot make the conditional true because these counterfactuals are things that God inspects before creating the world (and if he could make them true, the whole point for adducing middle knowledge to avoid divine causal determinism would be forfeited). And counterfactuals are hardly necessary truths; they are contingent. So nothing can make a counterfactual of freedom true.

(2) Other possibilities for the truth of [A] and [B] are ruled out on the assumption that the actions involved are free. Some conditionals (counterfactuals) are true because they are logically or causally necessary given their antecedents. But this does not work for counterfactuals of freedom. Saul's besieging of Keilah hardly follows by logical necessity from David's staying in Keilah. And, though, David's staying in Keilah (along with other factors) might causally necessitate Saul's besieging Keilah, it would incompatible with Saul's action being free.

This highlights how counterfactuals of freedom are significantly different from normal counterfactuals. In normal cases, say [if I had dropped the glass from 20 feet above the slab of concrete, the glass would have broken], there are truths about objects behaving in accordance with (causally determined by) laws of nature. The laws of nature governing the universe and the content of counterfactuals is determined by the existence of these laws. But there cannot be counterfactuals of freedom on this account. If there is a truth about how John (who doesn't exist and will not exist) would have acted in some circumstance C, then the truth can only be retained at the expense of John's freely acting in C.

(3) Perhaps there are non-necessitating grounds for the truth of [A] and [B], grounds in the desires, intentions, and characters of Saul and the Keilahites. But if the actions have non-necessitating grounds what would be true are the following counterfactuals of freedom:

[A*] If David stayed in Keilah, then Saul would probably besiege the city.

[B*] If David stayed in Keilah and Saul besieged the city, the men of Keilah would probably surrender David to Saul.

Although [A*] and [B*] are enough for David's action to be free, the new "probability" form of the counterfactual does not satisfy requirements for middle knowledge. God must know infallibly what will or would happen, not just what would probably happen or what free creatures would probably do. We can certainly have a justified belief in counterfactuals of freedom based on probabilities (but no incorrigible knowledge of how somebody would have acted freely in some circumstance).

So, at best there could only be truths about what certain people might do if placed in certain circumstances. People do have characters that lead to generalized statements about how they might act, but they are never so wholly determined here that it follows necessarily that, given who they are, they will act in such and such a fashion. And if this were true, we wouldn't have counterfactuals of freedom. Moreover, people can act out of character, so again we are left with mere probability judgements. But knowledge of what S might do is knowing that given C, S's action A is probable. But knowing that p is probable is not the same as knowing (incorrigibly) that p is true, for p could be probable and yet false.

With reference to (3), we must not confuse [A]'s being probable with [Saul will besiege the city] would be probable, given facts that would obtain if David stayed in Keilah. One might think that a commitment to [A*] involves saying that [A] is probably true. It would be pragmatically inconsistent to assert that [A] is probably true and yet there is no way that [A] can be true. In [A*] "probably" is being used to characterize dispositions or tendencies toward the truth of [Saul will besiege the city] that would be present if David stayed in Keilah.

If God foreknew what all sorts of creatures would freely do in all sorts of circumstances, then he could have selected only those creatures and/or circumstances which if actualised would involve creatures always freely choosing the good. If there are an infinite variety of natural and supernatural ways God can work on us inwardly, assisting beliefs, reasoning, desires (though without determining them) and if for every possible particular occasion of action there are possible divine operations that would elicit a favorable free response, is it not plausible to suppose that for many possible free creatures, and even worlds of them, there are possible sets of free actions (as responses to divine operations) which involve individuals always doing right, never doing wrong?

Counterclaim by Plantinga:

Universal Transworld Depravity (UTD):

Given any creature S and circumstance C, if S were actualised in C, then S would always choose the bad. Hence, there is no possible world in which there are no creatures who do not choose the bad if they have free choice at all.

Response (Swinburne):

UTD looks obviously false.

(1) Perhaps if God creates certain beings in certain circumstances, they will always screw up at some point. But surely it is possible that God create some beings in some circumstances who just by virtue of the beings they are and the circumstances in which they are placed never in fact screw up and do the bad. The infinite number of beings and circumstances that God could actualise seem to tell against the hypothesis of UTD. In our imaginations we can think up many creatures in circumstances who always do the good. Consider a possible world like heaven.

(2) David Lewis has argued the following: Why didn't God give creatures freedom only on those occasions when they were going to choose the good. Since we do in fact sometimes choose the good? And why doesn't God not give creatures freedom on those occasions when they would choose the bad if they were free (here God could control our actions). Free will defense is not committed to the thesis that everybody's intentional actions are always free, but that quite often a lot of people are free in their actions.

So, if God has middle knowledge, he could bring it about that there were free creatures with libertarian free will who, when they acted freely, only chose the good.

(1) God existed at t1 and God believed at t1 that J would do X at T2, and it was within J's power to refrain from doing X at t2.

(2) It was within J's power at t2 to do something such that [if he had done it, then a belief that God did have at t1 would have been false].

(3) It was within J's power at t2 to do something that would have brought it about that God had a false belief at t1.

Plantinga holds to (1) and accepts (2) as an entailment of (1). However, he does not accept (3) as an entailment of (1), and (3) is what would negate God's middle knowledge.

Argument elucidated:

Since knowledge that J will do X entails belief that J will do X, God's incorrigible knowledge that J will do X entails that God believes that J will do X, and since God is situated in time he believes at t1 that J will do X at t2. But assuming that causes cannot follow their effects, God's belief at t1 that J will do X at t2 is what it is at t1 and cannot be affected by what J does at t2. First, what J does at t2 cannot be the ground of God's belief at t1, such that J's action at t2 brings about God's belief that t1 (backwards causality). Secondly, if God has an infallible belief at t1 and J does what he does at t2 freely, then J can bring it about that J does other than what God believes J will do at t2. J will then have it in his power to bring it about that any of God's beliefs at t1 about what J will freely do at t2 are false. But then God cannot have incorrigible knowledge at some time about what someone will freely do at some layer time.

There is no incorrigible knowledge today about what S will freely do tomorrow, for S's doing A freely is just S's power to refrain from doing A and that power is the power to do what would make a precognizer's belief about S's action false. Since there can be no essential incorrigible omniscience about what free creatures will freely do, a fortiori there can be no essential omniscience about what free creatures would do if placed in certain conditions.

As for Plantinga's claim that (1) only entails (2) and not (3). If (1) did entail (3), then God could not necessarily have true beliefs, because on (3) it would be possible for J to do something which would make God's beliefs false. (2) and (3) are fundamentally different. (2) simply states that it was within J's power to do something at t2 such that if J had done it, then the belief God actually had would have been rendered false. Suppose God actually has the belief that J will do X or not X. What J has in his power is the ability to do something which does not involve God's belief becoming false (as in (3)), but rather [if J had done not X, then as a matter of fact God would have already held the belief that J would have done not-X]. J has merely counterfactual power over God's beliefs.

Unfortunately, there are only a few ways Plantinga can avoid (1) entailing (3).

(a) There is a pre-arranged harmony of some sort (with no causal relationships).

(b) There is backwards causality, God's belief at t1 being caused by what J does at t2.

(c) (1) involves a soft fact.

Hard fact about t1 = df. a fact, the truth conditions of which are at the time in questions.

Soft fact about t1 = df. a fact, the truth conditions of which are not all at that time in question (some lie in the future).

S's being 29 years old is a soft fact about now because what make it true is not merely the ways things are now but things which happened 29 years ago (the date of birth). S's getting such and such a post in philosophy at some future time is a soft fact about S now because whether it is true depends on what is yet future.

Are beliefs hard facts or soft facts?

Beliefs appear to be hard facts, for what makes it the case that S holds some belief is not what has been or what will be, but what is now, namely that S now holds the belief. What makes it a fact is that S holds the belief now.

Plantinga maintains that, though our beliefs are hard facts, God's beliefs are not hard facts at all. What makes it the case that God believes at t1 that J will do x at t2 is not anything that happens at t1 but rather what happens at t2. J's doing X at t2 is what constitutes (not makes or causes) it to be the case that God holds the belief that J will do X at t2.

To rule out backward causality is to rule out hard facts. There is no problem about some action at t2 making it the case there is some soft fact at t1. E.g. [a speech was made by the future president of the United States] is a soft fact. Grammatically it appears to be about the present, but it depends on future factors as well.

God's beliefs are what they are in virtue of what subsequently happens, says Plantinga. But, we can always respond thus: it doesn't look like we end up with beliefs in the ordinary sense of "beliefs" at all. Consequently, the resultant knowledge possessed by God isn't much like "knowledge" as we talk about it.