From: Michael Sudduth <msudduth@ix.netcom.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 1999 01:05:38 -0400
Subject: An Argument for the Temporal Priority of Causes to Effects
Keith, Vic, Tim, and others:
In my first post I expressed concern about the plausibility of what appears to be an emerging consensus on the list, namely that the following two propositions are logically consistent.
(1) Regeneration causes faith (at least in its exercise)
(2) Regeneration and faith are simultaneous.
Whatever differences exist between some of you, most of you seem to maintain the logical compatibility of (1) and (2). Although all of the original examples used to explain the relation between regeneration and faith seemed to me to undermine the truth of (2), it is clear to me that we need an argument against the truth of (2). Keith's Gear Analogy provided me with some discomfort. It shows that I overestimated the force of the ordinary, everyday examples or the commonsense view of things. What we need is an argument that shows that denying the temporal priority of causes to their effects leads to a conclusion that cannot possibly be true, for God or any created being.
Hence, I wish to offer here a plausible and I think a fairly persuasive argument for the temporal priority of regeneration to faith, and hence the falsity of (2). In fact the argument will entail that if (1) is true, (2) cannot be true. The argument is based loosely on the kind of argument proposed by Richard Swinburne in his chapter "Time" in *The Christian God* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.)
I think most of us agree to the following proposition.
(1) Regeneration R causes faith F (at least in its exercise) - agreed assumption in the discussion.
Now, let me suggest the truth of two other propositions essential to my argument.
(3) If (1) is true, then it is not possible that either F causes R or F causes not-R.
and
(4) If it is not possible that F causes R or F causes not-R, then (2) is
not true.
From (3) and (4), it follow that:
(5) Therefore, if (1) is true, then (2) is not true.
And, given (1) and (5), it follows that:
(6) Therefore, (2) is not true.
The argument is valid I think, but since some of you may doubt its premises, let me argue for the truth of (3) and especially (4).
Premise (3): If (1) is true, then it is not possible that either F causes R or F causes not-R.
Perhaps this will be obvious to most. But I'll give the argument anyway, as it is relevant to premise (4) too. The asymmetry of the causal relation entails that *if* event A causes event B, B cannot cause A. There can be no circular causation. Why not? Not merely because it would entail the possibility of event A causing event A. But because causation in a circle leaves open the possibility of event A causing event not-A. How so?
It depends on the notion that "what causes what" is a logically contingent matter. Statements like <A causes B> or <B causes C> are logically contingent. In other words, for any actual groupings of cause and effect, it might have been the case that they were grouped other than they are. (This should be rather obvious to theists who believe that the laws of nature are dependent on God's choice.) If it is true that John caused the guitar to make an F-chord sound at time t1, this truth is a logically contingent one. It might have been other than it is and there would be no contradiction is supposing that things might have been otherwise. So in the circular chain of causality, in which A causes B and B causes A, it might be the case that B has some effect instead of A. Among such other effects could be C, D, E, or, alas, not-A! But then it would be the case that it is possible that A causes B and B causes not-A, in which case it is possible that A (indirectly) causes not-A, which is a contradiction (and so not even logically possible). What is impossible cannot be possible. It is impossible for an event B to effect the prevention of its own cause A (For this reason John cannot kill either of his parents before they conceive him or he is born). Anything that entails that this is possible cannot be true. For this reason there cannot be backwards causation. The future cannot causally affect the past, as that leaves open the possibility of A causing not A. But since backwards causality (which is not possible) is an entailment of causation in a circle, there can be no causation in a circle. Hence, premise (3) is true.
Premise (4): If it is not possible that F causes R or F causes not-R, then (2) is not true.
This is not as obvious. First, (4) entails that if (2) *is* true, then it *is* possible for F to be the cause of R or F to be the cause of not-R. But is this true? Apparently so. Circular causality (and its absurd consequence mentioned above) is impossible only if simultaneous causality is impossible. Why? Simultaneous causality leaves open *the possibility* that A causes not-A. Again, if "what causes what" is a logically contingent matter, then let us suppose it is possible for A simultaneously to cause B. Surely it is also possible for B, simultaneously caused by A, simultaneously to be the cause of C. But since the causal relations are logically contingent, C *could*, logically speaking, be the cause of anything, including not-A. But in that case, it is possible that A indirectly simultaneously causes not-A, but this is not possible. Hence, (4) is true.
So Keith's A gear cannot be "simultaneously" causing the motion of gear B. Since what causes what is a logically contingent matter, among the possible effects of the motion of gear B would be the non-motion of gear A (i.e., the motion event that caused gear B's motion in the first place), but this is a precondition of the motion of gear B and it is not possible for an effect to prevent its own cause. Only if the A gear causation, whereby gear B is moved, is in the past (relative to gear B's motion) and the past is unaffectible by the future can one avoid gear A indirectly and simultaneously causing its one non-motion. So we have an apparently sound argument against regeneration (cause) and faith (effect) being simultaneous.
Another way of stating this argument is simply as a reductio from (2) and (1). In that case, the argument here claims that (2) leads to a self-contradictory conclusion, for (2), at least in conjunction with (1), implies a notion of simultaneous causality, and that it turn implies that what is logically impossible is possible, which is a contradiction. Since the steps that led to this conclusion are logically valid, the premise from which it was deduced must be false (since a true premises cannot logically entail a false conclusion). Since the premise is the conjunction of (1) and (2), which proposition is the false one? I will side with the Reformed tradition and maintain that regeneration is the cause of faith and disregard the Reformed blunder that unwisely claims that regeneration and faith are simultaneous. In a loose way of speaking perhaps they are, but in any strict sense such a possibility leads to a contradiction. So I think we have to say (i) the future is affectible; the past is not and (ii) causes are temporally prior to their effects.
Now, in the light of my response to Welty, it is clear that in advocating this particular argument, I must either deny divine timeless causality or argue that the argument above would not be applicable to God as a cause, which means that certain adjustments would have to be made to the argument, specifically to the anything can cause anything premise. As I suggested in the earlier post, I'm inclined to go the route of the latter. That's why I qualified earlier comments with *in the created order* causes are temporally prior to their effects. It may be, for instance, that the Humean principle "anything can cause anything" is only true with reference to contingent things. Considerations drawn from the nature of God, for instance, might make it inapplicable to what things God *can* bring into existence. (This would require discussions of the nature of God and modal logic - I digress for the moment). Or it may be that the temporal priority of a cause to its effect supervenes on the temporality of a cause itself. Is the necessary truth in question that *temporal* causes must be temporally prior to their effects? I'd be curious as to what Welty thought on this. Of course, if I find that there's no loophole here, I'll have to give up on divine timelessness. Uh oh. :)
Michael
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