Reply to Scott Oliphint on Sudduth on Plantinga (OSP Dialogue)[1]
Given Plantinga's
epistemology, is religious belief proper function rational?
I think that the settlement
Plantinga came to on this question at the close of our several discussions and
my paper was that religious unbelief could be *internally* proper function
rational, but not *externally* proper function rational. I'm also inclined to
share this verdict, with one proviso (below). I'm certainly no longer as
confident about the prospects for a person's acquiring a defeater for theistic
belief simplicter without some sort of cognitive malfunction. So if a person
does acquire a defeater for theistic belief, there will be cognitive
malfunction or external irrationality somewhere else in the person's cognitive
system. So only two questions really remain. First, can a person acquire a
rationality defeater for theistic belief? And, secondly, if so, in what precise
sense is it a *rationality* defeater?
I think the answer to the
first question is yes, and as I understand how things stand, Plantinga would
agree. This leaves us with the issue of how we are to understand the epistemic
ramifications of acquiring a rationality defeater. A rationality defeater does
defeat the proper function rationality of the defeatee, and thus does entail
the proper function rationality of some appropriate, alternate cognitive state.
So on that score the argument of my
paper stands. The question, not adequately addressed in my paper (since it
largely emerged subsequent to it) is whether this proper function
rationality/irrationality is only internal or also external. As I said above,
Plantinga denies that religious unbelief is, given an irrational defeater,
externally proper function rational, but accepts that it could be internally
proper function rational. Although I'm inclined to accept what Plantinga says
here, I do have one reservation.
Accepting his settlement
does depend on a particular understanding of external rationality, proper
function, and so-called irrational defeaters. Plantinga is able to sustain the
idea that religious unbelief is not externally proper function rational only
because he focuses on the *source* of the defeater in his analysis of the
rational status of the resultant cognitive state. Now either he is assuming a
principle of external irrationality transference (such as discussed in my
paper) or he has misdiagnosed the situation. I tend to think of the source of a
particular cognitive state that results from a defeater as being the defeater
system, a sub-system of the general cognitive system. Plantinga, on the other
hand, focuses on the source of the defeaters. He looks at the input to the
defeater system; I look at what is done with the input by the defeater system.
It makes a difference. The input is, in the cited cases, externally irrational.
What is done by the defeater system with such input is externally rational. So
which is really the relevant source of the resultant cognitive state on the
basis of which we ascribe external rationality or lack thereof to this
resultant state?
So, as far as your account
in the paper goes, I think you need to explicitly mention and consider that
proper function rationality may be either internal or external. Secondly, your
suggestion that we can have defeaters for theistic belief and yet this would
not make religious unbelief proper function rational raises a serious
consistency question. As I charged Plantinga, you can't have it both ways.
Either a person can acquire a rationality defeater to theistic belief or not.
If a person can acquire such a defeater, then the target theistic belief is
(for that person at that time) proper function irrational, or at least no
longer proper function rational. This is just what it means to acquire a
defeater. Acquiring a defeater for B
entails that B is defeated, and a defeated is a belief that has lost some
positive epistemic status. That's what a defeater defeats. A rationality
defeater defeats what can rationally be believed.
Hence, I think the position
you really are suggesting in your paper is what I broach at the end of my
paper, namely that there are no actual defeaters to theistic belief. If so,
theistic belief more closely resembles our belief in introspective truths or other
beliefs with epistemic immunities. If so, though, it is mistaken to suggest, as
you also want to suggest, that theistic belief is not immune to revision,
objection, argument, or *defeat*. This is probable the most important part of
your paper. What do you really commit yourself to when you agree that theistic
belief is not immune to defeat?
One of your main points in
response to my critique of Plantinga in the above paper revolves around the
following principle:
[P1] There are
circumstances C such that, given any human person S, if S is in C and S's
relevantly truth-aimed cognitive faculties are functioning properly, then S
holds a firm basic theistic belief.
In the cited paper, I
understand [P1] to leave open the possibility that there are other
circumstances C* such that in *those* circumstances, something less than a firm
theistic belief would be logically consistent with the proper functioning of
the SD. So in C, the rational thing to do is to hold a firm theistic belief by
way of the SD, whereas in C* the rational thing to do is not hold a firm
theistic belief. I take the situation to be analogous to sensory perceptual
processes. The design plan may stipulate that when being appeared to rainly, we
form the belief that it is raining outside. But in other situations, such as
when I have reason to believe that my neighbor is actually spraying water over
the fence in my backyard, the rational thing to do is not form the belief that
that it is raining outside. But in this case, though, my senses are not
malfunctioning. It is simply that the defeater system provides a circumstance
that activates a segment of my cognitive design plan that overrides the
deliverances of some of my other faculties.
You make several
observations at this juncture.
(A) "There is,
of course, a conflict in the way that Sudduth parses [P1], given that the
circumstances relative to the production of theistic belief are limited and
thus the possibility of PF-rational unbelief is affirmed. The latter, however,
does not follow from [P1] as stated, since, as stated, the only constraint on
the circumstances is that they exist, not that they be limited."
Yes, you are correct that
the PF-rationality of religious unbelief does not follow from [P1] as stated,
nor does it follow from [P1] that the circumstances in which theistic belief
are triggered are limited in any particular way. In my paper, the argument for
the PF-rationality of religious unbelief was based, not on [P1], but on the
application of [DP], the principle of PF-rationality defeat, to theistic belief
as produced in the way circumscribed by [P1]. My point was that [DP] is
logically consistent with [P1], but it is not as obviously consistent with [P4]
- the alternate SD account Plantinga offers. Clearly everything rides on
whether anyone can acquire a rationality defeater for theistic belief. If so,
then there will be a limitation to the
circumstances in which theistic belief is rational. But this limitation is imposed
by a principle of defeat, not anything intrinsic to [P1] itself.
Plantinga's long standing
position has been that there are widely realized experiential conditions that
*suffice* for the production of theistic belief (and knowledge). It was this
point that I was trying to capture in [P1]. It isn't clear from Plantinga just
how limited he takes circumstances to be.
Do they include, for instance, the sound of the high e string on my
Fender Stratocaster being plucked twice? Nonetheless, Al does take the
circumstances to be wide ranging and it looks like just about everyone is in
them at some time or another. The limit that must be imposed on rationality
conferring circumstances for theistic belief really stem from the nature of the
defeater system and defeasibility.
(B) With respect to
how Plantinga might evade my criticism: "Here all I think Plantinga needs
to do is extend C of Sudduth's [P1] to include creation itself., and then [P4]
would follow from [P1] such that, whatever defeater one acquired for theistic
belief would be the result of some cognitive, emotive, or volitional
malfunction. . . .it would still be the case that theistic belief would not be
immune to argument, objection, or defeat, but it would also be the case that
whenever a defeater was acquired for theistic belief it would [not] be a
defeater that undermined PF-rationality."
A few points here.
First, if your suggestion
is that there is no limit to the circumstances that *trigger* the formation of
theistic belief, then I don't see that this is inconsistent with my claim. There
can still be circumstances in which it would not be *rational* to continue
holding a firm theistic belief. This is just the upshot of rationality defeat.
Even if every experience of the created order suffices to trigger the formation
of theistic belief, it would not follow there is no circumstance in which such
a belief would fail to be rational and lose its positive epistemic status, say
as the result of acquiring defeaters.
I think what you want to
say is that there is no circumstance C such that the conjunction of C and an
acquired defeater D is sufficient to render religious unbelief PR-rational. But
this seems to entail denying that [DP] applies to theistic belief. And infact,
since [P4] is inconsistent with the application of [DP] to theistic belief, if
[P1] entails [P4], then you have essentially argued against there being
defeaters to theistic belief.
On this note, I'm not quite
clear on how your proposal works out, at least from within Plantinga's
framework. You want argue that theistic belief is always PF-rational, and yet
you also want to allow that there can be defeaters to theistic belief. If I
follow this argument, your point is that contrary to the argument in my paper
(and in agreement with Plantinga) the presence of acquired defeaters for
theistic belief would entail some sort of cognitive malfunction in the SD or
elsewhere in one's cognitive system. So be it. I made the point in my paper
(also made by Plantinga) that even irrational beliefs can be defeaters. But
defeaters are, by definition in this context, *rationality* defeaters; they
defeat the rationality of a belief. As Plantinga says several times in WCB,
they defeat what can rationally be believed. So it looks like religious
unbelief can indeed be rational, *even if it depends on the acquisition of
defeaters that in turn depend on malfunction somewhere else in one's cognitive
system.* Cf. according to Plantinga, irrational beliefs that one's cat is
attempting to kill one would render it rational to at least withhold belief in
the benign nature of all cats.
But rational in what sense?
This is probably the pivot, and something your paper needs to more directly
address.
Here is where I must add
something to the argument I presented in my paper. At the time of the paper in
question, I did not rightly emphasize and exploit the distinction between
external and internal rationality, especially in relation to the idea of proper
function rationality. In fact Plantinga developed this distinction in part I
think in response to the problem I introduced in the paper in question and in
the context of related discussions. I just spoke of "proper function"
rationality in the body of the paper, but added note no. 6 after further
discussion with Plantinga. In the note I allude to the distinction between
internal and external rationality, but really it required altering the argument
in my paper.
I think what Plantinga
wanted to argue at one point, and this is reflected in WCB, is that religious
unbelief is not proper function rational because religious unbelief always
depends on some cognitive malfunction (e.g., of the SD). More precisely,
religious unbelief is not proper function rational with respect to *external*
rationality. The situation would be comparable to ones he mentions in WCB (pp.
111-112, 303-306). Plantinga mentions two cases in which cognitive malfunction
can lead to the acquisition of defeaters. In the first, a paranoid belief that
so-and-so is out to get me fails to be externally rational, but as the result
of this state I come to believe D, that so-and-so us trying to ruin me. This
belief produced by a cognitive disorder can function as a defeater for my
previous belief that so-and-so is favorable disposed toward me. In the other
case, a cognitive disorder has the consequence that I believe some proposition
with less firmness than I would otherwise, but as a result of this the belief
is more susceptible to defeat. Plantinga cites the example of someone who comes
to hold that 2 +1 = 3 with about as much firmness as he believes his wife's
social security number is "n." A mathematics professor then provides
an argument to the person to the effect that it is false that 2 +1 =3. In this
case, I acquire a defeater for my belief that 2 + 1 = 3, though had I believed
it more firmly I would not have acquired a defeater for it.
What Plantinga wants to
argue is that in both these cases, the
person acquires a defeater for a belief because there is cognitive
malfunction elsewhere in the cognitive system. In other words, due to external
irrationality elsewhere, the person enters a cognitive state such that it is
"internally rational" to revise his beliefs in a particular way. And
his point about religious unbelief is the same I think. Assuming that religious
unbelief must always depend on cognitive malfunction somewhere else in one's
cognitive system, then if a person acquired a defeater for theistic belief,
this defeater would depend on that malfunction. Hence, that person's situation
would be one where a belief or cognitive state of religious unbelief failed to
be externally rational but would be internally rational.
My response to this is as
follows.
First, I could concede that
religious unbelief is at best only internally rational (and religious belief in
this situation only internally irrational). But this is still within the realm
of proper function rationality, for as Plantinga states (WCB, p. 110), internal
rationality is "a matter of proper function of all belief-producing
processes 'downstream from experience." In this case, the thesis of my
paper should have been that religious unbelief can be proper function
*internally* rational. But in that case, your proposal for defending Plantinga
against my criticism would only apply to an argument for the external
PF-rationality of religious unbelief. Moreover, if internal rationality is
required for warrant, a person who acquired a rationality defeater would no
longer be warranted in holding her theistic belief. This would be significant
for the earlier part of your paper regarding the natural knowledge of God,
specifically the claim that theistic belief is always, everywhere warranted
(sufficiently for knowledge).
Secondly, the distinction
between internal and external rationality in relation to proper function is a
bit fuzzy I think. Plantinga says that internal rationality is a matter of
having the appropriate (i.e., proper function) belief-response to doxastic or
non-doxastic experience (WCB, p. 111) External rationality, by contrast, is a
matter of "proper function with
respect to the formation of the sensuous perception on which the belief is
based. And it consists in the formation of the right kind of doxastic
experience" (WCB, p. 112). In other terms, external rationality has to do
with the sources of experience, doxastic and otherwise. The argument for the
external irrationality of religious unbelief, then, requires that the sources
of such a cognitive state involve malfunction.
But this argument really
depends on how one views the actual source of the cognitive state of religious
unbelief. As I was thinking of it when I wrote my paper, the source
defeater-based cognitive state of religious unbelief is the defeater system
itself. That source, of course, is functioning properly. That's why the state
of religious unbelief is proper function externally rational. Plantinga wants
to look at the sources of the input to the defeater system, certainly a
plausible way of thinking about this. But if the defeating belief is produced
by a malfunction, then obviously it is externally irrational. If *this* is made
the source of the cognitive state of religious unbelief, then it will be proper
function externally irrational. Actually, to be technical, I think in my model
(or the one I was assuming in my paper) defeating efficacy, on which the state
of religious unbelief is based, is the product of external proper function, but
the belief that functioned as input to the defeater system is externally
irrational.
Of course the situation is
slightly different where there isn't irrational input to the defeater system,
but rather malfunction leads to a less than firm belief B, thus rendering B
more susceptible to defeat. Again, I suppose one could think of the source of
defeater-based religious unbelief in this case as something externally
irrational; but I think it's hard to say for sure how we should think about
such cases.
Consider the following
example. Given that I believe that (M) my cat Salem is trying to kill me, the
(internally) rational thing for me to do is at least withhold my belief that
(C) all cats are benign creatures. Now my belief M is externally irrational but
internally rational. But my withholding C is internally rational and
"locally" externally rational since it is the product of a properly
functioning defeater system, which does not - on Plantinga model - discriminate
between rational and irrational input. Now there is something externally wrong
with my cognitive situation, namely my holding (M), though this is internally
rational. But if I continued to hold (C), there would be two things wrong with
me from an external rationality viewpoint, namely (M) and the failure of my
defeater system to revise my beliefs accordingly and withhold (C). So perhaps
there is something like proximate and remote external rationality, depending on
the depth of external rationality ingression. I discuss something similar to
this in the early part of my paper.
Modifying my thesis, then,
I would argue that defeater-based religious unbelief has *proximate* external
PF-rationality, but not *remote* external PF-rationality. It has a kind of
*local* external rationality associated with the proper functioning of the
defeater system, which I regard as a source of experience (doxastic and
otherwise).
So the person who acquires a
defeater that depends in anyway on cognitive malfunction is really stuck
between an epistemic rock and cognitive hard place.
Were we designed to hold
beliefs contrary to theistic belief? This is a central question in your paper,
to which you say, no. I would say that the appropriate answer, given the
flexibility of the concept of design plan, is yes and no. The design plan
surely stipulates that for maximally rational people, there are no conditions
under which religious unbelief is either internally or externally rational. The proper functioning of their
defeater system will never require religious unbelief. But there isn't *one*
single cognitive design plan, a point Plantinga makes but which seems missing
from your discussion. There is Adam's design plan, and there is – if God is
fully omniscient - a design plan also for creatures who are less than fully
rational due to the fall into sin. Put otherwise, there is a pre- and
post-lapsarian design plan, to make a general distinction of design plans. Harmartic
cognitive malfunction has consequences for what is rational to believe, in much
the same way that believing what is false renders certain actions rational for
a person, though not all things rational. By one man sin entered the world and
by sin objections to theistic belief, and so defeated theistic belief passed
over many people.
I don't see that any of
this is inconsistent with what Paul says in Romans chapter 1 at all. Even if
the verses entail a universal natural knowledge of God, this does not imply
that such knowledge is diachronically invariant. This is something assumed in
your paper, but which to my mind needs considerably more argument. On what
Biblical basis can we argue that no person can lose any or all of the natural
knowledge of God?
At the end of the day, I
think Plantinga's only escape would be either to deny that irrational beliefs can be defeaters or to deny that there
can be actual defeaters for theistic belief. Perhaps the former entails the
latter. Similarly, it seems to me that in your paper a major question you need
to resolve is whether anyone can
acquire defeaters for theistic belief in such a way that the concept of defeat
does not end up epistemically vacuous. But it is precisely this dilemma that my
paper intended to make evident.
Copyright © 2000 Michael
Sudduth
[1] This discussion concerns arguments presented in my paper, Can Religious Unbelief be Proper Function Rational? Faith and Philosophy (July 1999). My comments here in reply to Scott Oliphint represent my position subsequent to publishing the paper in question. While I remain committed to the basic line of argument in the 1999 paper, my reply to Oliphint represents my more mature thinking on the argument. The commentary thus fine-tunes the original argument in important ways.