The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology

Dr. Michael Sudduth

Book Prospectus and Outline

(Revised, November 2, 2002)

 

 

I. General Project Description

 

In The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology I examine the place of natural theology in the Reformed theological tradition, from its fons et origo in the work of John Calvin to prominent 20th century representatives of the Calvinistic tradition. Since the dominant tendency of 20th century theologians and philosophers has been to regard the Reformed tradition, in principle and in point of its historical development, as opposed to the project of natural theology, the current work may be more precisely described as a philosophical examination of the alleged Reformed case against natural theology.

 

       I argue three main points in this work:

 

·        Contrary to the views expressed by a large number of prominent 20th century theologians and philosophers, the Reformed theological tradition on the whole has not opposed natural theology.  More precisely, a majority of thinkers representative of the Reformed tradition have affirmed some natural knowledge of God and endorsed the project of developing rational arguments for the existence and nature of God.  Although some influential Reformed theologians have criticized natural theology, such criticisms are often directed toward natural theology construed in a particular sort of way, and thus their criticisms do not represent a wholesale rejection of natural theology.  Moreover, the more radical criticisms of natural theology tend to be clustered historically in the post-Kantian stream of Reformed theology, especially in the Dutch Neo-Calvinist tradition, and represent an important discontinuity with earlier segments of the tradition as expressed by 16th and 17th century Reformed Scholasticism and 18th and 19th century British and American Calvinism.

 

·        The historical case for the Reformed endorsement of natural theology implies a prima facie Reformed case for natural theology. Reformed theologians who have supported or defended the project of natural theology typically view natural theology as a logical implication of three epistemologically relevant facts: the existence of (i) a general revelation of God in the universe, (ii) a natural knowledge of God on the basis of (i), and (iii) some natural knowledge of God being inferential in nature. Theistic arguments, then, are viewed as either a mode by which some natural knowledge of God is acquired or as at least representing a way in which the natural knowledge of God may be confirmed, clarified, or extended by way of reflective inquiry.

 

·        The prima facie Reformed case for natural theology is ultimately undefeated by the main objections to natural theology among Reformed theologians. Of the main philosophical and theological objections to natural theology found among Reformed theologians (i.e., immediacy of the natural knowledge of God, logical objections to theistic arguments, arguments from the noetic effects of sin, Sola Scriptura, and the impropriety of the apologetic use of theistic arguments), none provides a sufficient reason to reject natural theology.

 

These three points allow a thorough philosophical analysis and a historical examination of natural theology in the Reformed tradition. What emerges is a historically conscious and philosophically robust defense of natural theology. The overall conclusion is in many respects a resurrection of the more favorable estimate of natural theology among many prominent Calvinists from the 17th to 20th century. Here we have a stream of Reformed theology that is frequently neglected in contemporary discussions, but whose insights await rescue and repackaging in the light of contemporary developments in philosophy.

 

II. Background to Project

 

Broadly stated, natural theology refers to what can be known or rationally believed about God, His existence and nature, on the basis of human reason or man's natural cognitive processes. Since the natural process whereby such knowledge is acquired is typically taken to be inferential in nature, natural theology is ordinarily identified with arguments for the existence of God. As such, natural theology belongs to a long tradition of philosophical inquiry beginning with Presocratic reflections on the origin and ultimate nature of the cosmos. Systematically developed under the influence of Jewish, Islamic, and Christian thinkers in the medieval period, natural theology has proven a resilient mode of philosophical inquiry despite the continual challenges to it by many modern and contemporary philosophers, religious and non-religious alike.

 

The more widely known criticisms of natural theology tend to be distinctly philosophical criticisms originating with David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and modified at the hands of subsequent agnostic and atheistic philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, Anthony Flew, J.L. Mackie, and Quentin Smith.  But there are distinctly religious objections to natural theology as well, objections that play an important role in thinkers like Soren Kierkegaard and Karl Barth. Moreover, the reemergence of philosophy of religion in Anglo-American academia in the second half of the twentieth-century has done much to bring both kinds of objections to natural theology into greater focus. Interestingly enough, there is a certain confluence of the philosophical and religious objections to natural theology in the Reformed theological tradition originating with Martin Luther and John Calvin. Indeed a widely held view in contemporary philosophy of religion and a prevailing attitude of much 20th century philosophy and theology is that the Reformed theological tradition has consistently opposed the project of natural theology.

 

There have been several important 20th century contributions to the topic of natural theology in the Reformed theological tradition that set the context for the present work.

 

·        Karl Barth not only rejected natural theology himself but also maintained that such a rejection was historically rooted in the Protestant Reformation, specifically in the work of John Calvin. Several prominent Calvin commentators have followed Barth at this juncture (e.g., T.H.L Parker, Calvin’s Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1959)), though not without opposition from other scholars (e.g., Edward Dowey, The Knowledge of God in Calvin’s Theology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952)).

 

·        John Baillie’s influential work Our Knowledge of God (London: Oxford University Press, 1939) provides an important 20th century Protestant critique of natural theology and a corresponding case for construing our natural knowledge of God as immediate. Ballie regarded all inferential approaches to the knowledge of God as rooted in Greek philosophy and – from the Biblical point of view – wrong in principle.

 

·        In historical theology, Richard Muller and Rev. John Platt have each provided substantial evidence that confirms a Reformed commitment to natural theology among Reformed scholastics in the 16th and 17th centuries, as well as the evolution and nature of this commitment and how it may be distinguished from natural theology in post-Enlightenment Reformed dogmatics. See Platt, Reformed Thought and Scholasticism: Arguments for the Existence of God in Dutch Theology: 1575-1650 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1982); Richard Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: Vol. 1, Prolegoma to Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1987), and "The Dogmatic Function of St. Thomas' 'Proofs': A Protestant Appreciation," Fides et Historia, XXIV:2 (1992), pp. 14-29.

 

·        Several prominent 20th century Reformed apologists (e.g., Auguste Lecerf, Cornelius Van Til, Gordon Clark) have strongly opposed the tradition of natural theology, especially as developed in the Thomistic tradition. While earlier generations of Reformed apologists (e.g., B.B. Warfield, Charles Hodge) made free use of theistic arguments as part of their approach to defending the faith, many Calvinists moved away from this method in the 20th century and developed new approaches to apologetics without a dependence on traditional theistic arguments, which they have found suspect for a variety of reasons. See Lecerf, An Introduction to Reformed Dogmatics (London: Lutterworth Press, 1949); Van Til, The Defense of the Faith (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1955); and Clark, Religion, Reason, and Revelation (Jefferson, MD: The Trinity Foundation, 1986).

 

·        In the last 20 years the Reformed epistemology movement, associated with the work of Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and William Alston, has brought the alleged Reformed disapproval of natural theology into yet sharper focus. Nicholas Wolterstorff has affirmed the Reformed tradition’s “negative attitude toward natural theology” (“The Reformed Tradition,” in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion (Blackwells, 1997), p. 165). Alvin Plantinga’s paper “The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology” (in Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 54, 1980) provided a non-Barthian, philosophical assessment of the alleged Reformed discontent with natural theology. Plantinga and other Reformed epistemologists have developed insights found in previous thinkers (from Calvin to Baillie) and emphasized the immediacy of our natural knowledge of God, in contrast to both the tradition of Enlightenment evidentialism and the Thomistic tradition of natural theology, both of which have emphasized the importance of arguments for God’s existence. Plantinga’s intricate epistemology of religious belief has been carefully laid out in his most recent Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford, 2000). Plantinga of course claims that the basic model of theistic and Christian belief articulated in this book is rooted in insights found in the Reformed theological tradition, among theologians such as John Calvin, Jonathan Edwards, Abraham Kuyper, and Herman Bavinck.

 

·        Dewey Hoitenga’s book Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga: An Introduction to Reformed Epistemology (State University of New York Press, 1991) identified “vitality” and “immediacy” as the central features of the Reformed view of our knowledge of God. Hoitenga traces these ideas from Plato to Augustine, to Calvin to Plantinga, noting the divergence from the Thomistic tradition of natural theology in several places. Although Hoitenga thinks that the Reformed tradition may find a proper place for inference and argument (and thus natural theology) as a way of extending and developing what is known immediately, he argues that the rational justification of belief in God in no way depends on either positive arguments or the ability to answer objections to theism. In this, Hoitenga may be construed even going further than Plantinga.

 

·        In Rational Faith: Catholic Responses to Reformed Epistemology, ed. Linda Zagzebski (University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), several well-known Catholic philosophers provide a thorough-going critique of the claims of Reformed epistemology as developed by Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and Alston. This work is an important one, as it suggests that the place of natural theology in the Reformed tradition has implications for broader polemical issues in the interface between Protestant and Catholic theology. According to Zagzebski, the Catholic contributors, unlike the Reformers, have a high regard for natural theology and are strongly committed to the efficacy of natural reason in attaining knowledge of God, as well as the grounding of revealed theology in natural theology. A similar analysis and criticism of the Reformed tradition is found in Norman Kretzmann’s discussion on Reformed epistemology in The Metaphysics of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 9-20.

 

III.  Dialectical Architecture of Project

 

       The various contours of the 20th century dialogue leave us with a few crucial questions. To what extent is the 20th century assessment of the Reformed opposition to natural theology correct?  And to the extent to which we find opposition to natural theology among Reformed theologians, to what exactly are these thinkers objecting? Are these objections plausible objections to natural theology? In The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology, I attempt to answer these questions.

 

The dialectical structure of the work involves five stages of argument.

 

I.                On the basis of a detailed and comprehensive historical investigation, I argue that there has been a widespread and consistent endorsement of natural theology in the Reformed theological tradition.

 

In chapters 2 through 4, I aim to rebut the prevalent 20th century view that the Reformed tradition has on the whole opposed natural theology. I examine the Reformed commitment to natural knowledge of God and theistic arguments from the time of the Reformation to the 20th century, with a special focus on Reformed scholasticism, Puritanism, and 18th and 19th century British and American Reformed theology.

 

II.            On the basis of the Historical Argument (in I above), I argue that there is a prima facie Reformed justification for natural theology grounded in the Reformed commitment to (a) some natural knowledge of God derived from a natural revelation in the created order, (b) some of this knowledge being distinctly inferential in character, and (c) the formulation of theistic arguments as an attempt to (i) extend a basic natural knowledge of God acquired in a more spontaneous manner, (ii) confirm, clarify, and formalize the natural cognitive processes utilized in acquiring natural knowledge of God, (iii) refute the sophistry of atheism and agnosticism, and (iv) provide the Christian with a way of deepening his understanding of the concept of God and strengthening his faith.

 

While the main line of argument in chapters 2 through 4 is historical, the historical argument reveals a normative one, a Reformed justification for natural theology. Suggested in chapters 2 through 4, this case is explicitly articulated in chapter 5, along with a summary of the main features of theistic arguments in the Reformed tradition. But the case only purports to establish the prima facie rational acceptability of natural theology in the context of the Reformed tradition. Hence the case can be defeated by overriding reasons for supposing that some aspect of the prima facie case is mistaken. These objections to be considered in the remainder of the book constitute just such a set of potential defeaters against the prima facie case.

 

III.         I critically examine two sorts of general philosophical objections to natural theology that threaten to defeat particular aspects of the prima facie Reformed case for natural theology.(Chapters 6-9)

 

A. EPISTEMOLOGICAL OBJECTION from the innate, intuitive, or immediate knowledge of God: Some Reformed theologians have argued that the actual grounds of our natural belief in God show that belief in God is basic, not inferential, and as basic it can constitute knowledge in the absence of the arguments of natural theology. Hence, natural theology is epistemically unnecessary. Hence, this objection attempts to rebut claim II.B (above) in the Reformed case for natural theology and thereby undermine a crucial tier in the Reformed case for natural theology. Chapter 6 considers this objection as developed prior to the 20th century. Chapter 7 considers the objection as developed by contemporary Reformed epistemology.

 

1.  RESPONSE I (chapter 6): After examining several classical arguments for immediate knowledge of God (from the Protestant scholastics to the early 19th century), I argue that these arguments fail to show that the knowledge of God is exclusively immediate for several reasons. (a) The argument based on Calvin’s discussion of the sensus divinitatis is at best inconclusive. (b) Many of the arguments assume an overly narrow conception of inferential belief. (c) At best the arguments would establish only the psychological immediacy of theistic belief, not necessarily its epistemic immediacy. (d) At best the arguments would show only that some natural knowledge of God is immediate, not that no natural knowledge of God is inferential. (e) Even if the knowledge of God is wholly immediate, this would not eliminate a broad range of other functions for theistic arguments, such as providing a confirmation of the natural processes implicated in acquiring immediate knowledge of God.

 

2.  RESPONSE II (chapter 7): After examining the claims of contemporary Reformed epistemology, which provide a more philosophically sophisticated defense of immediate knowledge of God, I argue that the central claims of Reformed epistemology are logically consistent with several important epistemic functions for natural theology in addition to those considered in relation to the classical arguments. (a) Even if natural theology is unnecessary for theistic belief to be warranted (“warrant” being the property that transforms true belief into knowledge), natural theology may be necessary for showing that theism is true or showing that it is warranted. (b) Even if theistic belief is warranted in a basic way, an evidential requirement, satisfied by the arguments of natural theology, may nonetheless be consistently applied to second-order beliefs about the warranted status of theistic beliefs. (c) A person’s basic warranted theistic belief may be defeated in certain circumstances and thus cease to be warranted, at least to a degree sufficient, along with true belief, for knowledge. Under such defeating circumstances the arguments of natural theology can play an important role as a defeater-defeater, thereby restoring the warrant of theistic belief. (d) I argue that it is likely that our natural knowledge of God draws on multiple sources, immediate and inferential, especially in the face of defeaters to theistic belief of various sorts. Natural theology, either as carried out by the individual or by others in the individual’s epistemic community, can contribute in an important way to the warrant of theistic beliefs.

 

B. LOGICAL OBJECTIONS based on the contentions that (i) theistic arguments are vitiated by various logical fallacies that affect their soundness and (ii) theistic arguments do not demonstrate the existence of the true God, the God of Scripture, but rather the God of philosophers. In this second objection, I consider two God-of-the-Philosophers objections. According to the first, the description of the god found in the conclusions of theistic arguments is inadequate as a description of the God of Scripture. The second objection is that the description of the god of the theistic arguments is logically inconsistent with the God of Scripture. The logical objection to natural theology attempts to rebut II.B and rebut and undercut elements in II.C of the prima facie case. (Chapters 8 and 9)

 

1. RESPONSE I (chapter 8): I argue that, while some of the logical criticisms made by Reformed theologians are correct, these criticisms at best apply only to certain forms of natural theology, e.g., Thomistic natural theology. (a) They do not apply to contemporary probabilistic and cumulative case arguments, both of which have been endorsed by Reformed theologians since the middle of the 19th century. (b) They do not apply to the formulation of theistic arguments construed as arguments for the nature of a God whose existence is antecedently known in an immediate way. There are thus three primary weakness to the Reformed logical criticisms of natural theology. (c) Some of the Reformed objections to theistic arguments borrow philosophically implausible arguments from Hume and Kant.

 

2. RESPONSE II (chapter 9): After examining two different God of the Philosopher type objections, I conclude that none of the arguments examined provides an adequate basis on which to argue that the being picked out by the term “God” in the conclusion of theistic arguments does not successfully refer to the God of the Bible, especially when theistic arguments are taken cumulatively. Neither the contention that the description of this being underdetermines the God of Scripture nor the stronger argument that the description of this being is inconsistent with the God of Scripture is ultimately successful in undermining the claim that these arguments constitute good arguments for the existence of the God of the Bible.

 

IV.           I Critically examine three essentially theological objections to natural theology that threaten to  defeat particular aspects of the prima facie Reformed case for natural theology.(Chapters 10-12)

 

A. OBJECTION I from the Noetic Effects of Sin, according to which the effects of sin on the human mind are either inconsistent with (i) any natural knowledge of God or (ii) any inferential knowledge of God.  The first objection is rooted in prominent interpretations of Calvin; the second is located in subsequent Reformed thought. (chapters 10-11)

 

1.    RESPONSE I (chapter 10): The alleged denial of natural knowledge of God in Calvin rests on a basic equivocation on the term “knowledge” in the Calvin texts. The inability to properly navigate between the different senses in which Calvin uses this term and its cognates leads to implausible conclusions concerning Calvin’s stance on the natural knowledge of God. Although there is an existential and moral sense in which fallen, unregenerate human persons do not possess a natural knowledge of God, Calvin does not by this imply that fallen, unregenerate humans lack all propositional knowledge of God.

2.    RESPONSE II (Chapter 10): I argue that the objection to inferential knowledge of God based on the noetic effects of sin should be construed as maintaining that sin undermines the warrant of inferential theistic beliefs in fallen, unregenerate persons. I call this noetic effect of sin, “postlapsarian epistemic deficiency” (PED). I consider two general theories of warrant to test the plausibility of PED, epistemic internalism and externalism. (a) I argue that under internalist theories of knowledge, PED poses a serious obstacle to inferential knowledge of God for fallen, unregenerate persons.  (b) I argue that PED does not pose as serious of a problem for inferential knowledge (for fallen, unregenerate persons) under some externalist theories.

3.    RESPONSE III (Chapter 11): Even if fallen, unregenerate persons are unable to arrive at knowledge of God by way of inference due to the noetic effects of sin, this is logically consistent with their being good theistic arguments and these arguments being of use to the Christian (who enjoys the noetic benefits of regeneration) in acquiring a degree of reflective rationality with respect to her theistic beliefs and deepening and strengthening her faith.

 

B. OBJECTION II from the Reformed Doctrine of Sola Scriptura (by Scripture alone), understood here as entailing that our ideas of God ought to be derived from and shaped solely by Scripture and not human reason or philosophy. The objection seeks to undermine element II.C.iv of the prima facie cause. (Chapter 11)

 

1.      RESPONSE I (chapter 11): This particular interpretation of Sola Scriptura undermines the Reformed idea of general revelation, according to which God has revealed truth about Himself in the created order. This implies that knowledge of God is not derived exclusively from Scripture.

2.      RESPONSE II (chapter 11): Scripture underdetermines many of the elements of the Reformed doctrine of God (e.g., divine timelessness, logical immutability, necessity). These elements of the doctrine of God can only justified on the basis of an activity of reason that seeks to clarify and augment the contents of divine revelation with the aid of conceptual distinctions and philosophical principles not contained in Scripture.

3.      RESPONSE III (chapter 11): Scripture can nonetheless play a positive role in guiding philosophical inquiry.

 

C. OBJECTION III from the apologetic impropriety of the use of theistic arguments on the grounds that all such uses presuppose (i) a stance of unbelief, (ii) the unbeliever does not already know God, (iii) human autonomy and epistemic neutrality or (iv) the inadequacy of negative arguments. This objection aims to target element II.C.iii of the prima facie case. (Chapter 12)

 

1.    RESPONSE I: Even if theistic arguments ought not to be used in apologetics, this would still allow such arguments an intra-faith function articulated in previous chapters.

2.    RESPONSE II: The use of theistic arguments does not entail a stance of unbelief since nothing is implied about the grounds of a believer’s faith in the act of providing reasons for those outside the faith.

3.    RESPONSE III: The use of theistic arguments in apologetics need not assume that the unbeliever does not know God already. He knows God in a general way, but theistic arguments may bring such knowledge to consciousness and also pin down a more specific understanding of the nature of the God known immediately.

4.    RESPONSE IV: The presentation of theistic arguments need not presuppose human autonomy, i.e., that human cognitive powers would be fully efficacious whether or not God exists. The crucial point here is to note that in presenting theistic arguments, the apologist can thematize epistemic neutrality or he can remain silent on this issue (or alternatively, he can thematize the lack of epistemic neutrality). I also suggest at this juncture the need to develop distinctly epistemological arguments for God’s existence that will explicitly articulate the dependence of epistemic efficacy of human reasoning on the existence of God.

5.    RESPONSE V:  The apologist need not choose between negative apologetics (answering objections made against the faith) and positive apologetics (presenting reasons for supposing that Christian theism is true). Both sorts of approaches are logically consistent, and the apologist is right to utilize the best arguments of both sorts for the apologetic task.

 

CONCLUSION:

 

The standard Reformed objections to natural theology fail to present an adequate case against natural theology. Moreover, by clarifying the actual range of epistemic, intra-faith, and apologetic functions for natural theology, the prima facie case of Part I has been both defended and refined in important ways. I believe this conclusion reinforces insights found in the Scholastic tradition and in 18th and 19th century Reformed theology but which have been systematically ignored among many Post-Kantian Reformed thinkers. The Reformed tradition has good reason to revise its more recent critical stance toward natural theology and modestly embrace that project, as many past generations of Calvinists have.

 

IV. The Place of the Present Work in Relation to the Current Literature

 

         Although there are a plethora of books on the market today dealing with natural theology, and many dealing with so-called Reformed epistemology, none of these provides a rigorous philosophical and historically sensitive investigation of natural theology in connection with the Reformed tradition. The works on Reformed epistemology are typically deeply involved in examining the immediacy of the knowledge of God or answering objections to Christian belief, while the works on natural theology aim at defending or critiquing natural theology from a philosophical perspective, independent of the Reformed tradition. The present work provides an important bridge between works in natural theology and those on Reformed epistemology. More importantly, it fills an important gap in the literature in contemporary philosophy of religion, while at the same time forging a positive tie between recent historical studies in Reformed thought and contemporary epistemology.

 

Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford University Press, 2000)

 

Plantinga has done a masterful job at developing a model according to which theistic and Christian belief can be rational and constitute knowledge even in the absence of the evidential considerations associated with natural theology. But as many of his critics have written, what about natural theology? Indeed, the question is of relevance not merely from the vantage point of Protestants sympathetic to natural theology and Thomistic Catholics, but also from the perspective of the Reformed tradition itself. The present work attempts to take over where Plantinga and other Reformed epistemologists have left off. This requires clarifying the positive role of natural theology given the claims of Reformed epistemology, or showing that theistic arguments can be important, even necessary, contributions to the positive epistemic status of theistic belief without undermining the central claims of Reformed epistemology.  Such a project will bring an important balance to the epistemology of religious belief in the Reformed tradition.

 

Linda Zagzebski, Rational Faith: Catholic Responses to Reformed Epistemology (University of Notre Dame Press, 1993).

 

This volume contains a very helpful Catholic perspective on the Reformed epistemology movement. It does not, however, address natural theology in the Reformed tradition. If anything the contributions tend to assume the commonly held Reformed opposition to natural theology. However, many of the insights of the contributors can be implemented by the Reformed tradition. Hence, in my project there is a clear attempt to apply some of the suggestions made by contributors to this collection. For instance, my theory of defeater-based evidentialism represents an attempt to synthesize Reformed epistemology with observations made by both Philip Quinn and John Greco on the restricted necessity of evidences for theistic knowledge.

 

Dewey Hoitenga, Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga: An Introduction to Reformed Epistemology (State University of New York Press, 1991).

 

Hoitenga aims to show that Reformed claims about the immediacy of the natural knowledge of God are rooted in Augustine and Plato, and thus are not the product of modernity. Although this work is a valuable one in drawing attention to the ancient and classical lineage of some of the epistemological insights found in the Reformed tradition, it does not provide any systematic engagement with the topic of natural theology in the Reformed tradition. It does not consider the range of objections to natural theology in the Reformed tradition, nor for that matter does it consider the positive role of inferential knowledge of God and theistic arguments originating with the Protestant Scholastic tradition. In fact, Hoitenga explains in the “Epilogue” to the book that there is still a need for a further development of a Reformed account of “faith seeking understanding.” Among other things, the current project aims to contribute to this by examining the intra-faith function of natural theology.

 

Richard Muller, Post-Reformation Dogmatics, Vol. 1: Prolegomena to Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1987), and John Platt, Reformed Thought and Scholasticism: The Arguments for the Existence of God in Dutch Theology, 1575-1650 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1982).

 

These works by Muller and Platt provide an important historical examination of natural theology in the Reformed tradition. Muller devotes a couple of chapters to the problem of natural theology and the role of philosophy in the development of Reformed dogmatics. Platt devotes his entire book to tracing the emergence of theistic arguments in the Protestant Scholastic tradition. Both works are historical in nature, and confined to an examination of the Protestant Scholastic tradition. Neither work examines natural theology in a comprehensive manner, nor do they attempt a philosophical analysis of the positions they articulate. Consequently important questions in epistemology are not addressed, and there is no philosophical examination of the objections to natural theology in the Reformed tradition.

 

Arvin Vos, Aquinas, Calvin, and Contemporary Protestant Thought: A Critique of Protestant Views on the Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Grand Rapids: Eeerdmans, 1985).

 

Vos provides a fresh look at Protestant misunderstandings of Aquinas on a variety of issues in the interface between theology and philosophy, natural theology included. The work is largely devoted to comparing Calvin and Aquinas on faith and reason and closely allied topics, as well as engaging the early phase of Reformed epistemology. Although natural theology is discussed in the work, specifically in relation to Calvin, there is no systematic discussion of natural theology in relation to the Reformed tradition as a whole.

 

V. Short Outline

 

Chapter 1: The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology

PART I: The Reformed Endorsement of Natural Theology
Chapter 2:  The Natural Knowledge of God

Chapter 3:  Theistic Arguments in the Reformed Tradition I: 16th and 17th Centuries

Chapter 4:  Theistic Arguments in the Reformed Tradition II: 18th to 20th Century

Chapter 5:  Theistic Arguments and the Prima Facie Case for Natural Theology

PART II: Philosophical Objections

Chapter 6:  The Innate or Intuitive Knowledge of God

Chapter 7:  Contemporary Reformed Epistemology

Chapter 8:  Logical Objections to Theistic Arguments

Chapter 9:  Logical Objections to Natural Theology: the God of Theistic Arguments

PART III:  Theological Objections

Chapter 10: Calvin and the Noetic Effects of Sin

Chapter 11:  Noetic Effects of Sin and Sola Scriptura

Chapter 12:  Natural Theology and Reformed Apologetics

 

VI. State of the Project

 

At the present time, a final draft of the book is scheduled for completion by summer 2003.

 

Current list of readers includes: Richard Swinburne (University of Oxford), Alvin Plantinga (University of Notre Dame), William Alston (Syracuse University), Paul Helm (King’s College London), Dewey Hoitenga (Grand Valley State University), Nicholas Wolterstoff (Yale University), John Zeis (Canisius College), Arvin Vos (Western Kentucky University), and Kelly Clark (Calvin College)