In a recent issue of Westminster Theological Journal, K. Scott Oliphint presented a substantial review and critique of the lifework of Alvin Plantinga.¹ Although a large portion of the essay focuses on Plantinga's recent work in epistemology, Oliphint attempts to locate Plantinga's epistemological views among his more general views on reason and belief in God. Oliphint's exposition of Plantinga's epistemological views seems substantially faithful to Plantinga's text. However his assessment of Plantinga's defense of religious belief is seriously flawed. In this essay I will make some cursory remarks about Plantinga's epistemology and defend Plantinga's views concerning reason and belief in God against Oliphint's careless presentation of them.

Plantinga has developed a Christian alternative to modern foundationalism's contention that all of one's rational or justified² beliefs must be based on beliefs that are either self-evident, evident to the senses or incorrigible.³ Since belief in God is neither self-evident, evident to the senses, nor incorrigible, modern foundationalism insists that it be based on such beliefs; rational belief in God, it is claimed, requires the support of evidence or argument of a particularly stringent kind. The evidential base that one is permitted to construct such an argument upon is so spare, however, it is difficult to see how one could possibly argue for the existence of God.⁴ Nonetheless, a great many modern foundationalists argue that it is irrational to believe in God.

Plantinga, firm (and apparently rational) believer in God that he is, objects that modern foundationalism has misunderstood the nature of rationality. Oliphint rightly relates Plantinga's decisive arguments against modern foundationalism. Modern foundationalism is based on an unattainable quest for certainty. In addition, the beliefs that are permitted into one's foundations are too paltry to justify not only belief in God but many other important beliefs as well such as belief in the past, belief in an external world, and belief in other persons. Modern foundationalism has failed to show that these beliefs are genuine items of knowledge. Since we surely know that there is a past, that there is a world independent of our beliefs, and that other persons exist, modern foundationalism must be wrong. Knowledge, it seems clear, is not captured by the criterion set by modern foundationalism. Oliphint tells the story to this point quite well.

Oliphint also rightly relates Plantinga's theory of warrant. Plantinga argues that the special property that turns true belief into knowledge⁵ is called "warrant." A belief B has warrant for one if and only if B is produced by one's properly functioning cognitive faculties in circumstances to which those faculties are designed to apply; in addition those faculties must be designed for the purpose of producing true beliefs.⁶ So, for instance, my belief that there is a computer screen in front of me is warranted if it is produced by my properly functioning perceptual faculties (and not by weariness or dreaming) and if no one is tricking me say, by having removed my computer and replaced it with an exact painting of my computer (they have messed up my cognitive environment); and surely my perceptual faculties have been designed (by God) for the purpose of producing true beliefs. I have stated this succinctly, roughly, partially and without nuance.

Note briefly the portions of Plantinga's definition which are not within one's immediate or direct purview -- whether or not one's faculties are functioning properly, whether or not one's faculties are designed, whether or not one's faculties are designed for the production of true beliefs, whether or not one is using one's faculties in the environment intended for their use (one might be seeing a mirage and taking it for real). We cannot acquire warrant, according to this theory, simply by attending to our directly available beliefs. According to Plantinga, warranted belief or knowledge is not entirely up to us. It depends crucially upon whether or not conditions neither under our direct rational purview nor our conscious control are satisfied. Justification is by faith not by works. Warrant, to be more precise, is not solely due to efforts on our part.

So far Oliphint's presentation of Plantinga's views is careful, clear and accurate. However, when it comes to locating Plantinga's epistemology within Plantinga's lifework, in particular when it comes to the discussion of Plantinga's views on belief in God, Oliphint's accuracy falters.

In God and Other Minds Plantinga demonstrates the deficiency of every argument in support of the existence of other minds. Nonetheless, surely it is rational to believe in the existence of other minds (not, according to Plantinga, "a kind of pragmatic rationality" as Oliphint alleges). Plantinga extends the rationality of the kind possessed by belief in other minds to belief in God. Oliphint comments: "The best that the argument in God and Other Minds can accomplish, therefore, is to set belief in God as rational relative to belief in other minds." (423)

In his later arguments against evidentialism and the modern foundationalism that it typically presupposes, Plantinga argues that belief in God is properly basic -- it is a justified, non-inferential belief; that which one may legitimately reason from and not to. In this respect it is like belief in other minds -- it is non-inferential, foundational, not in need of evidence. Oliphint rightly notes: "Thus his [the evidentialist's] demand for evidence is arbitrary and confused and belief in God takes its place alongside belief in other minds and other properly basic beliefs." (424) So far, so good. But three sentences later, Oliphint tendentiously remarks:

But Oliphint is just warming up. He finally takes off his gloves:

I believe that this is the first time that anyone has ever had the temerity to accuse Plantinga of superficiality! I defy anyone to carefully read his well-argued and complex books and feel that such a charge is justified! But some of Oliphint's criticisms have been made by other critics and are worthy of consideration.

Oliphint returns to Plantinga's parity argument in God and Other Minds. Oliphint alleges that Plantinga makes belief in God parasitic upon belief in other minds. Oliphint confusingly calls M' the set of propositions constituting Plantinga's argument for other minds. But that misses Plantinga's point entirely, since there is no argument for other minds (and it is difficult to see how there could be). Oliphint continues:

Let us hear Plantinga's justly famous formulation itself: "Hence my tentative conclusion: if my belief in other minds is rational, so is my belief in God. But obviously the former is rational; so, therefore, is the latter."⁸ I am not aware of any place where Plantinga even hints that belief in God depends upon (for rational acceptance) any argument whatsoever, including the "argument" for other minds. Indeed, Plantinga has argued just the opposite -- belief in God does not stand in need of any argument for rational acceptance. Oliphint stands alone in his assertion that Plantinga contends that belief in God is being dependent on the other minds "argument."

Oliphint further faults Plantinga for making belief in God "contingently rational." It is rational only to the extent that compelling arguments are not offered against it. Now contingent rationality, as defined, seems to me to be a paradigm conception of a rational agent. If compelling arguments are offered against a belief that I hold (and upon reflection I understand them to be compelling), then surely I should give up that belief. Contingent rationality does not require that, in the meantime, I hold such beliefs tentatively -- for surely I rationally adjudge that some beliefs are more likely to be refuted than others -- my belief about extra-terrestrial life, for example, or the highest wind speed on earth or the cause of the extinction of dinosaurs. About these I may hold rational beliefs but hold them lightly or tentatively. My beliefs that grass is green and the sky blue, however, might change due to compelling argumentation; but I am firmly committed to such beliefs in the meantime. If compelling argumentation were forthcoming that my wife was a cleverly constructed robot, then surely I should desist believing that she is a person. In the meantime I will enthusiastically cuddle with her, rejoice with her and cry with her, committed as I am to the belief that she is a person. There is the slight logical possibility that I am mistaken in my belief that my wife is a person and I am open to compelling arguments to the contrary (logically but not, of course, experientially) but I'm not holding my breath.⁹

With respect to belief in God, surely I will hold it with all requisite firmness yet renounce it if compelling arguments are introduced against it. Now such arguments, I take it, must be compelling -- they must be sound arguments that employ premises that it would be folly for me to reject. If such arguments were presented to me or to anyone, I can't see why reason would not require me or anyone to reject belief in God. Of course, I don't think any such arguments are forthcoming any more than I think such arguments are forthcoming against my belief in my wife's being a person. Furthermore, I am not alleging that people should give up belief in God on the basis of apparently compelling arguments (like arguments from evil or science); I take it that a compelling argument is ultima facie not merely prima facie compelling. But if, per impossible, someone were to offer an ultima facie compelling argument against belief in God then reason requires that we abandon that belief. This may rankle some fideists who find it brave and laudatory to believe in God even if it is absurd but this is neither my nor, I believe, Plantinga's position.

Oliphint contends that Plantinga makes belief in God doubly contingent. It is open to refutation by compelling argument and it is dependent upon the rational acceptance of belief in other minds; this, Oliphint alleges, places belief in God "in the most tentative position imaginable." (428) So we are back to Oliphint's unusual construal of Plantinga's parity argument. It is clear from the context of Plantinga's parity argument and his subsequent writings that he means that belief in God is, in some respects, like belief in other minds. How is belief in God like belief in other minds? I take it that Plantinga's insight is that belief in God and belief in other minds are warranted in a similar fashion and not that the former is logically contingent on the latter. There are other similarities which draw Plantinga to the analogy. Both beliefs are partly propositional, partly experiential; both beliefs are about persons; both beliefs are fundamental; neither belief is like a scientific hypothesis or theory. Belief in God and belief in other minds share these important epistemological characteristics yet neither is epistemologically based on the other.

Consider another claim of Oliphint: "Because Plantinga has failed to challenge the roots of disbelief in God, because he has not dealt with the presuppositions behind such belief, he has argued for belief in God to be placed on the same grounds as unbelief." (429) The inference Oliphint alleges clearly does not follow: my Grandmother has done little to challenge the roots of disbelief in God but she surely has not argued that belief in God be put on the same grounds as unbelief. More fundamentally, however, the first portion of his claim is false. No one in recent memory has done more to courageously, consistently and fervently challenge the roots of disbelief in God and the presuppositions behind such belief than Plantinga. Let me mention a few: his dismantling once and for all of the deductive argument from evil, his thorough and debilitating critique of the verification principle assumed by logical positivism, his unmasking of the pervasive secular presuppositions of our time -- perennial naturalism and creative anti-realism, his demonstration of the deficiencies of the evidentialist objection to belief in God, his sustained attacks on liberal theology and biblical scholarship, and his powerful critique of naturalistic evolutionary theory with which he concludes Warrant and Proper Function. Oliphint alone believes that Plantinga has not dealt at all with such issues.

Oliphint accuses Plantinga of not only not challenging the evidentialist's conception of rationality but of adopting it. This follows, of course, only on Oliphint's systematic misreading of Plantinga's defense of belief in God as dependent on the justification of belief in other minds. He goes even further: "In so doing, he has implicitly denied the created nature of human rationality as well as the standard of rationality in the mind of the character of God himself." (429-430) Plantinga's argument in Warrant and Proper Function, however, is a carefully constructed argument the conclusion of which is that humans can know precisely because their cognitive faculties have been designed by God with the purpose of putting his creatures in touch with the truth (or reality). Indeed Plantinga claims that in this respect we are image bearers of the divine; God is intellective -- he is a truth grasper and has put that ability into us. Plantinga affirms, pace Oliphint, that the standard of rationality is in the very mind of God. The naturalist, so Plantinga's argument goes, has no adequate account of design and cannot consistently makes claims to know. This argument has infuriated countless atheists. But Oliphint contends that it is not present in Plantinga at all. One wonders on what basis he makes such claims.

So, again contra Oliphint, Plantinga does make "the ontological fact of God's necessity...an epistemological fact as well." (430) He does assert, again contra Oliphint, that God's existence is necessary for humans to know things. And he has not, as Oliphint alleges, removed or made God tangential to the problem of knowledge. (430). And finally, consider Oliphint's remark that "Plantinga accepts and works with a notion of rationality that has been delimited by a system in which God is excluded at the outset." (432) Hear the words of an atheist on Plantinga's epistemological views: "...Plantinga and I disagree in our accounts of what is involved in such 'proper functioning,' since he wishes to explain this in teleological terms, and ultimately...in theological terms..."¹⁰ Even atheists recognize the thoroughly theistic character of Plantinga's argument. And why shouldn't they? Here is Plantinga's own summary of his argument: "We have...seen that this view of warrant is a naturalistic one, but one that requires, for its best flourishing, to be set in the context of supernatural theism."¹¹ Plantinga understates his case since this quotation is located right after he has offered a powerful argument against naturalism; warrant, therefore, can flourish only in the context of theism. Plantinga's argument to this effect might be deficient, but one can scarcely claim that he has not thus argued. Oliphint's attributions of such positions to Plantinga are positively, systematically and emphatically refuted by Plantinga's text.

Now no doubt Plantinga's views are different from Oliphint's on many of these matters. Plantinga, for example, would probably claim that even for the atheist to know something, her cognitive faculties must have been designed by God; that is, to use Oliphint's terms, even the atheist requires the ontological fact of God's existence as necessary for knowledge. But it does not follow from Plantinga's definition of warrant that atheists must be aware of God's existence or submit to God's authority in order to know things. They can deny the existence of God and still have other cognitive faculties that were designed by God to produce true beliefs in the circumstances in which they are intended. So the atheist can know that the sky is blue, that 2 + 2 = 4, and that she had porridge for breakfast even if she does not believe that God exists. For her perceptual, arithmetical, and memory faculties can still function properly in the appropriate circumstances (even if her sense of the divine is being repressed). Likewise her digestive faculties can function properly even if she is unaware that they are designed by God. Here Plantinga would depart from radical interpretations of the antithesis which contend that the unbeliever can know nothing at all; rightly so, it seems to me, as the radical interpretations of the antithesis seem utterly implausible. But Oliphint seems led to just this radical interpretation if he insists that in order to know one must start with (conscious) belief in (the Christian) God (as understood by Calvin). And his criticisms of Plantinga seem to lead him to embrace such a position.

Oliphint's errors multiply without necessity. I shall consider only two more examples. Oliphint repeatedly alleges that Plantinga treats belief in God as a hypothesis. One single, unifying theme of Plantinga's work, from beginning to end, is that belief in God more relevantly resembles belief in other persons than belief in a hypothesis. Let us hear Plantinga speak for himself: "Clearly these remarks are relevant only if we think of belief in God as or like a sort of scientific hypothesis, a theory designed to explain some body of evidence, and acceptable to the degree that is explains that evidence... But why should we think of theism like this? Clearly there are perfectly sensible alternatives."¹² Plantinga also writes:

Out of the mouth of Plantinga pours forth phrases (that refute Oliphint).

Oliphint accuses Plantinga of depriving believers of any certainty for their beliefs, of making belief tentative, hypothetical, etc. We have already seen that Plantinga does not propose treating belief in God as a hypothesis or holding it tentatively. I don't know Plantinga's views on faith and certainty. But since Oliphint often refers to Calvin's writings against Plantinga, it is fitting to refer to Calvin's writings against Oliphint. Calvin writes of a convinced and certain faith, of belief without wavering.¹⁴ However, he quickly proceeds to add:

I do not intend to resolve this paradox for Calvin. It seems clear to me, however, that just as we are not perfect in practice in this life, so to we are not perfect in belief. Neither moral perfection nor belief untainted by doubt can be attained ante mortem.¹⁵ Calvin seems aware of this obvious fact and Plantinga may be; I, for one, don't see how any reasonable person could deny it.

I can't recall ever reading such a systematically uncharitable interpretation of Plantinga's work. The difference between the first half of the essay, which accurately presents Plantinga's arguments from Warrant: the Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function, and the second half of the essay, which misleadingly attributes views to Plantinga, couldn't be more pronounced. Plantinga has been read more charitably and with more respect by atheists who are supremely hostile to his project. That Oliphint has been so unfair does a disservice to the Christian community. I say this, in part, because one of Oliphint's early claims is that Plantinga's views are anti-Christian. Bearing false witness against the views of another person is un-Christian. I believe that Plantinga's position on these matters is evident. One wonders why Oliphint has been unable to see what everyone else finds readily apparent.

Is Plantinga's position really anti-Christian? Surely Oliphint must concede that Plantinga's views on epistemology and belief in God are a Christian position if not the Christian position. Would Oliphint judge that anyone that does not share his presuppositional views is not simply wrong but is also anti-Christian? Would he adjudge that Aquinas, Augustine, Anselm, Edwards, Locke, Montaigne and virtually every other great philosopher who attempted as best he or she could to understand faith and reason are not simply wrong but, like Plantinga, anti-Christian? I am suspicious of anyone who attributes the labels anti-Christian, non-Christian or heretic to the views of serious and sincere Christian philosophers or theologians on matters of faith, reason and philosophical theology.

As I see it, Scripture woefully underdetermines most any philosophical position.¹⁶ Is God inside or outside of time, simple or complex? Does God suffer or is he impassible? Can God can change the past or possess middle knowledge? These, and countless other positions, affirmed by one group of Christians and just as enthusiastically rejected by others, are simply not sufficiently well-supported by Scriptural evidence to make a universally coercive case for them. Likewise a universally coercive case from Scripture cannot be made for one's apologetic approach; there is simply not enough unambiguous evidence from Scripture to support evidentialism, presuppositionalism or Plantinga's views as the Christian view.

The reason that Scripture underdetermines any apologetic approach seems clear. The Bible was written during a time when virtually everyone assumed the existence of some god or other. The Bible does try to make a case that Yahweh is God and the New Testament tries to make a case that he has revealed himself uniquely in the Christ (in both instances, the biblical writers refer to the kinds of beliefs that people in their culture might find appealing). But everywhere the existence of a god is presupposed. That we should directly import that approach into our contemporary context seems ill-advised. In our culture, a great many people do not believe in the existence of a god. How those people might be best approached, therefore, will require a great deal of human ingenuity and not merely reflection on how it was done in biblical times. Since so much has been left to human ingenuity and since Scripture both underdetermines one's apologetic and was written to and for another culture, there will be many Christian apologetics and not merely one. What Christian virtue requires, in dealing with one another's views, is charity, intellectual respect, fairness and humility -- all of which were sadly missing in Oliphint's misguided attack on Plantinga.¹⁷