The growing influence of Aristotle in the 11th century posed problems for orthodox Jewish, Islamic, and Christian theology. Among other things, Aristotle maintained the eternity of the world (not the sublunar world but the celestial spheres). More precisely, the influence of Aristotle during this period was often a version mixed with Platonist influences. From this arose the theory of emanation. God is good, goodness has an intrinsic tendency to share itself, to overflow (in metaphorical terms). So the universe is eternal in this specific sense: the universe is the necessary out flowing of the divine nature into corporeal forms. On this view, the universe has no beginning in time, and so is eternal, and it is necessary. God had no choice to create it.

(1) The world was created out of nothing (ex nihilo) by a free act of the divine will, and with that creation came the beginning of time. [creationism]

From which it follows that:

(2) God is the transcendent creator.

But, the Aristotelians held:

(3) The universe is eternal and necessary. [Avicenna and Al-farabi both challenged (1)]

Since many of those who held (3) also wanted to maintain (2), they had to find a way to maintain God’s transcendence. How could God be appropriately distinguished from the world? How could God be the transcendent creator and yet the world be necessary and eternal (without beginning in time)?

Aristotle had distinguished between WHAT A THING IS and THAT A THING IS, a distinction between essence (quiddity) and existence. This distinction is exploited and developed by medieval philosophers to reassert God’s transcendence within the framework of the pressures of Greek Necessitarianism. Although introduced by Al-Farabi (9th-10th century), it is one of the important contributions of Avicenna (A.D. 980-1037).

1. When the quiddity of a thing is not contradictory, it is thought of as possible in itself.

2. The existence of a possible always depends on some other thing as a cause, for something must cause esse (existence) to be joined to a quiddity.

3. This second thing must either be possible in itself or more metaphysically ultimate. If it is only possible in itself, it caused by another, such that ultimately it is caused by something which is metaphysical ultimate.

4. The metaphysically ultimate M is not caused by anything else. In this case, there is no need for esse to be added to the quiddity of M, for the quiddity of M guarantees the esse of M. The quiddity and esse are each one, inseparable. So M is necessary in the sense of uncaused and also in the sense that it is contradictory to deny its existence. M is sui generis.

There is a division between NECESSARY BEING and CONTINGENT (or POSSIBLE) BEING.

BUT

5. Whenever there is [a possible X in itself], if you add esse to X, X is necessary through another, which gives X esse (or causes X to have esse).

And

6. The universe = the addition of esse to every quiddity (as a possible in itself) from what is necessary in itself.

7. So everything [possible in itself] is actual by being made necessary through another which is necessary in itself.

"Considered in itself" the universe as an effect of God is radically contingent. It does not contain the conditions of its own existence. In itself, it need not exist. For all contingent things: "existence is an accident attaching to what exists." Causes give a thing being. If we abstract the world from its causes, we can see it also as radically contingent. But I we view it in the light of its cause, then it is necessary. God is transcendent by virtue of being the necessary through itself.

a. God is the only uncaused thing in the world.

b. Everything other than God is brought about by some cause external to itself.

Causal explanations are reductions to necessity. If a thing is not necessary in itself, it is necessary through another. Aristotle applied this to things within the cosmos, but not the cosmos itself - Avicenna breaks new ground. Aristotle maintains this because he sees the cosmos (specifically motion) as eternal, and what is eternal is necessary. According to Avicenna, what is eternal or infinite may owe its existence to another, necessary not in itself but through another. Celestial beings need not be the stopping points for explanation. They too are contingent and not necessary. No contradiction is involved in denying the existence of the world, even if in fact it has existed for eternity. The truest cause is not the transient efficient cause that officiates at the origin of a thing, but the enduring cause that sustains and perpetuates it.

The distinction between essence and existence (as articulated by Avicenna and later by Aquinas) marks an important development in medieval philosophy. The Greek view of contingency was restricted to certain aspects of the universe: plurality and change. The pre-Socratics were led to postulate a single arche as the principle and cause of the cosmos - specifically its unity and order. Plato’s Demiurge is responsible for bringing a cosmos (order) out of pre-existing chaos. It is far from clear that the supreme being in Plato creates the matter of the world. He is responsible for everything except the existence of the world. Likewise, Aristotle is interested in explaining why the world is the way it is, especially the perennial problem of change. The first mover explains, not the existence of things, but the fact that there is change in the world. The distinction between essence and existence permits a more radical statement of contingency. Given that distinction, what God explains is the very existence of the world. Existence itself, not merely change, is contingent. Thus, even if the world is eternal (has no beginning in time), it is still radically contingent, for it is possible that it might not have existed at all. And since it does not have existence of itself, it must be caused to exist. And even if it is eternal, it will be caused to exist from all eternity.

Similarly, since the explanandum is now existence itself, God (the explanans) will not only be one and immutable, but will lack composition of essence and existence. The sui generis character of God as an explanatory principle leads to the doctrine of divine simplicity. God is now understood to be a necessary being: a being whose existence is uncaused and cannot be denied without contradiction. Such a being is wholly simple.

For Avicenna and Maimonides, the distinction between essence and existence functions primarily to distinguish possible from necessary being, and a way of affirming the uniqueness of the necessary existent. 

1.If a thing has a quiddity (a nature), then it is caused.

2.But God is not caused.

==========================

3.Therefore, God has no nature.

Argument for 1:

4.If a thing has quiddity, then the nature of a thing is other than its existence,

5.If the nature of a thing is other than its existence, then it is caused. (for in no other way could it be brought to existence)

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1.If a thing has quiddity, then it is caused.

The question, what is the nature of God?, presupposes that there is something, distinct from existence, whereby God is divine. "There is no quiddity for the necessary existent, " writes Avicenna "other than the fact that it is necessary existent - and that is its to-be [al-anniyya]."

There is an initial and powerful dilemma regarding our discourse about God. Either we make God out to be a kind of superhuman or Greek god (just like us or more so) OR he is made so distinct from us that we cannot speak of him at all. Religious language involves the distinction between God and the creature, we can make too much of that distinction or not enough.

Islamic theologians were divided over whether the divine attributes where identical with God's essence or distinct from it. The Muslim Al-Ghazali thinks of God as acting very much like humans, only with greater power and knowledge. Averroes reasserts the difference between God and creatures, which he takes to be an essential feature of Islam. God possesses attributes in the most perfect and complete manner. He thereby counters the gross literalism of Al-Ghazali.

Whereas Averroes held to an equivocal link between ordinary language and religious discourse, Maimonides argues that there is no connection at all. We can only talk about God's actions and the effects of those actions, but no positive predication can be applied to God.

Why this move? Why such an extreme position?

Maimonides saw this as a necessary consequence of God being immaterial, simple, and immutable.

In the Guide of the Perplexed we read that:

1. God has no essence in the sense that we can define him. (1:51-52)

2. God is not divisible into a collection of qualities and has no properties connected to him in a contingent way. (1:52)

3. He cannot be affected or influenced by anything else in existence (1:55)

4. To assert that God exists is itself beyond understanding if "exists" takes its meaning from the existence of contingent beings. (1:56)

Scripture asserts that God is one and transcendent creator of the universe. If this is true it would seem that God is sui generis. And this in turn, at least suggests, that God is wholly simple - lacking all metaphysical composition (not only a composition of essence and existence, but composition of even essence and accidental properties, etc.). But if this is true, then how can we talk about God at all?

1. Essence Attribution: Q is predicated x, where Q = the definition (nature) of x.

Man is a <rational living being>.

2. Attribution of Necessary Property: Q is predicated of x, where Q is a part of the definition (ro essence)of x.

Man is a <living being.>

3. Accidental Attribution: Q is predicated of x, where Q is a quality of x which is not part of the essence of x.

John is <angry>

4. Relational Attribution: Q is predicated of x by virtue of a relation x sustains to y.

Elvis is <the father of Lisa Marie.>

5. Action Attribution: Q is predicated of x by virtue of x’s having performed some action.

Elvis <sang ‘Are you lonesome tonight">.

Maimonides rejects all the attributions above with reference to God except the last. His reason is basically that all the others are incompatible with God’s simplicity, and - as we shall see - God’s simplicity is taken to be a necessary consequence of God’s being transcendent. It is THE way of distinguishing God from the world.

1. Attributes indicative of essence, part of essence, or qualities cannot be predicated of God.

In each case these are not applicable to God:

a. God has no causes anterior to him by which he may be defined.

B. God has no parts and so cannot have parts of an essence.

C. God has no accidental parts either, and so lacks qualitative attribution.

(I) he does not possess any quantity (because he lacks spatial extension...is not a body), (ii) he does not receive impressions, (iii) has no dispositions, etc.

2. God has no relational attributes.

Since God is a necessary being and all other things are possible. God and creatures belong to two different ontological orders. All relational predication presupposes that the things in relation are within the same ontological order.

1. People are not led to belief in divine attributes by speculation

2. People are led to belief in divine attributes by following the external sense of scripture.

When taken in a literal sense, Scripture predicates attributive qualifications to God, and so people believed that God has attributes. However, these same people do not think of God as a material being. But by thinking of a God with attributes, they have not emptied their idea of God from the mode of materiality - namely accidents.But this external sense of Scripture cannot be taken literally anymore than it can when speaking of God as though he is a body.

The purpose for using attributes in scripture is to predicate perfection to God, but not the same one’s possessed by creatures. Most of the so-called attributes of God are attributes of action. Since a multiplicity of different actions may be predicated of a single agent, action attribution is permitted with reference to God.

Examples:

Elvis sings and eats.

Fire blackens, burns, cooks, etc.

In these cases, it is not that there are a multiplicity of qualities subsisting in the essence of a thing. Fire performs all these actions by means of one quality - heat.

Negative theology involves making statements about God by denying of him what is true of human beings. According to Maimonides, describing God by way of negation is the correct way of talking about God.

1. Similar to attributes of affirmation, attributes of negation particularize a thing, but it does so by way of exclusion. To say that X is a living being is to achieve a kind of particularization by exclusion: X is not dead, or not not-alive.

2. Different from attributes of affirmation, attributes of negation do not give us any truth about the essence (whole or part) of a thing.

What might be thought of as accidental attribution is really action attribution in God’ case.

What might be thought of as essence (or essential) attribution is really negative attribution in God’s case.

All of the specific actions of God take on the form of positive action attribution.

All of the essential attributes of God are taken as negations.

God exists = God’s non-existence is impossible.

God is living = God is not dead.

God is immaterial - God is not material

God is eternal = God has no cause for his existence

God is powerful = God is not powerless

God is knowing = God is not ignorant

God is willing = God is not negligent

Every attribute of God is either an attribute signifying some action of God’s

or an attribute signifying the negation of some privation.

It might seem that if the preceding is true, that any revelation from God is wrong-headed and that any command from God to grow in a knowledge of our creator is similarly wrong-headed.

1. Our Silence is Praise to God

Maimonides responds: we grow in our knowledge of God by means of denying of him more and more things which are true of the created order. (P. 384-385) Conversely, the more we predicate of God positively, the closer we move toward unbelief.

Scriptural basis for this view: "Silence is praise to thee" (Psalm 65:2).

[[Silence with regard to you is praise.]]

2. The Torah sets the Constraints for positive attribution

Nevertheless, we can speak of God in positive terms only to the extent that the Torah does an that the prophets used them in prayer. Scripture is a model for how we talk about God.

This is accommodation. It is permitted, but for those who are mature, the proper way of speaking about God becomes manifest.

Avicenna and Maimonides both advocate the thesis of divine simplicity - that God lacks all metaphysical composition. We have seen that this is a exigency of explaining the existence of the world, for whatever explains the existence of the world cannot be the sort of thing which logically or causally needs explaining itself (sui generis nature of principles). The doctrine is also thought to be the best way to affirm the uniqueness of God and his distinctness from all creation. God is truly transcendent only if he is without composition, and consequently such that essence and existence are one in him. It allows a way to reconcile God as creator with the eternity of the world.

Simpleness is more than: there are no distinctions in God. Simpleness is not a lack, but a perfection! Simpleness is not an attribute of God, but a formal feature of divinity whereby we define the manner in which properties might be attributed to God.

To say that God is simple is not to speak directly about GOD, but to speak about God's ontological constitution.

level one: God is good, God is wise => speaks directly about God

level two: God is simple => speaks directly about the properties of God named at level one.

(limitlessness, eternity, immutability, and oneness)

Simplicity is a meta-level of theological discourse in which we establish the rules for theological talk, or the constraints of the logic of theological grammar.

© Michael Sudduth 1996