*Originally published in Religious Studies, March 1995

According to Calvin, "There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of divinity....God himself has implanted in all men a certain understanding of his divine majesty" (I. iii. 1).¹ In addition to this internal sensus divinitatis inscribed or engraved on the hearts of all people, Calvin draws attention to another source of man's natural knowledge of God: "The knowledge of God shines forth in the fashioning of the universe and the continuing governing of it" (I. v. 1). "Not only," writes Calvin has God, "sowed in men's minds that seed of religion of which we have spoken but revealed himself and daily discloses himself in the whole workmanship of the universe. As a consequence, men cannot open their eyes without being compelled to see him" (I. v. 1). These passages suggest two apparently distinct modes (or sources) of man's natural knowledge of God. In book 1, chapter 3 of the Institutes, Calvin establishes that the knowledge of God has been naturally implanted in the human mind. In the next chapter, he argues that this (naturally implanted) knowledge of God has been smothered and corrupted. Then, in book 1, chapter 5 Calvin goes on to say that, not only has God sowed the seed of religion in the minds of men, but he reveals Himself daily by means of the unmistakable marks of His glory which He has placed on his individual works. Subsequent to Calvin (beginning in the Abridgements to the Institutes and in the various commentaries on the Heidelberg Catechism) it became commonplace in Reformed circles to capture Calvin's distinction here in terms of a distinction between an internal and external witness or revelation.² There are two distinct modes by which man has a natural knowledge of God, one internal, innate, and a priori and another external, in the work of creation, and a posteriori.

Whether we view Calvin as maintaining a natural knowledge of God by way of reasons or arguments will depend heavily on how we take Calvin's apparent distinction (or--to beg no questions--whether there is a distinction) between the knowledge of God "implanted in the mind" and that knowledge "set forth in creation." This century Edward Dowey (following B.B. Warfield) has suggested that experience provides the raw material, as it were, out of which man draws conclusions about God. Hence the knowledge is inferential and based upon empirical observation. Dowey speaks of the "highly inductive character" of Calvin's "natural arguments,"³ and asserts that, according to Calvin, "man infers certain attributes of God from nature." T.H.L Parker, on the other hand, argues that "Neither chapter 1 nor chapter 5 of book I ought to be interpreted as supplying the Calvinian equivalent to St. Thomas' demonstrations."⁴ Parker does not think that Calvin should be viewed as in any way presenting or sanctioning inferential knowledge of God. Most recently, Alvin Plantinga has added a contribution to this debate by maintaining that we have been created with certain innate dispositions to form belief in God in the appropriate circumstances, where these circumstances at least include widely realized experiential conditions, such as observing the starry night sky or some other aspect of the created order.⁵ This recent interpretation seems to avoid the difficulty of two-mode theories by reducing the mode to one consisting of (at least) two conditions, one of which is internal and the other which is external to the individual.

I should begin by stating up-front that the prospects for establishing any explicit commitment to theistic arguments in Calvin is quite bleak. Recent Calvin scholarship has shown quite conclusively that the explicit endorsement of arguments for the existence (and attributes) of God is something which formally entered into Protestantism through the development of Protestant scholasticism in the second half of the 16th century under Reformed theologians such as Theodore Beza, Peter Martyr Vermigli, Zacharias Ursinus, and Girolamo Zanchi.⁷ The significant methodological shifts that took place between Calvin and the calvinists suggest an explicit distinction between the Christocentric biblical theology of Calvin and the theocentric philosophical theology of his followers. Consequently, where the philosophical theologian is interested in a knowledge of God's existence (and attributes) by natural reason, Calvin has a different goal in mind. He aims to develop a knowledge of God (not simply of his existence), but a knowledge which affects and moves to worship--a knowledge, we might way, that has an existential and ethical dimension.⁸ Edward Dowey points out that it is difficult to pin down an exact definition to Calvin's use of the word "knowledge," though he suggests that "existential" best describes the affecting awareness at which Calvin is aiming.⁹ So, bearing in mind these distinctions, any attempt at treating theistic arguments or mediate natural theology in Calvin will have to rest content with rather modest goals and cautious claims.

Crucial to the case for a mediate natural theology is the meaning of inferential knowledge, for the possibility of the former depends on what we understand by the latter. To this end, it will be needful to do some epistemology and clarify the notion of grounds of belief and what it means for a belief to be based on other beliefs. If we think of beliefs as the output of various cognitive processes or mechanisms, we can think of the ground of a belief as the psychological input to the relevant cognitive mechanism, and where this input may be either beliefs or experiences (in the broad sense). The based-on relation will then be spelled out in terms of the processes taking account of the appropriate features of the ground and the belief being formed--as it were--in the light of these features. Hence a ground will not be the total input to a belief-forming mechanism, but those features of the input that are taken account of in the actual formation of the belief.¹⁰ We can now draw a distinction between two quite different ways one may believe or know something where this belief or knowledge is mediated by reasons. There is one sense in which a person can possess knowledge mediated by reasons, even though S has not gone through any conscious process of inferring p from q. Grounds may be implicitly possessed and their being utilized in the formation of a belief need not be something the subject is aware is happening. As long as other propositional attitudes are the features of the input taken account of, S may believe p on the basis of some other belief, even though S is not conscious of the fact that she is believing on the grounds of some other beliefs she possesses. This can be contrasted with a mediate knowledge that is the result of the subject inferring some proposition p from some other proposition q which constitutes an adequate reason for p. The latter type of mediate knowledge can be called argumentative; the former nonargumentative. What has often confused matters is that both have been referred to as cases of inferential knowledge, and applied to theistic belief both could be classified as instances of mediate natural theology. In both cases knowledge is formed on the basis of other things a person believes or knows. But we should not confuse a belief's being based on other beliefs (and thereby being mediated by them) with the activity of inferring a belief from other beliefs.¹¹

The distinction between these two types of believing for a reason has been treated at length by the epistemologist Robert Audi, and his distinction is quite helpful. Audi distinguishes between "structurally inferential" beliefs and "episodically inferential" beliefs.¹² S may believe that the Jones's are home for the reason that their living- room lights are on. S does not believe that the Jones's are home because he has gone through a process of inferring this as a conclusion from a premise (or set of premises). S takes note of the fact that the lights are turned on in the Jones's living- room and, already possessing the belief that when the Jones's living-room lights are turned on in the evening the Jones's are home, the belief that they are home is formed. S's belief that when the Jones's living room lights are turned on the Jones's are home is taken account of (along with the belief that the lights are now turned on) in the formation of the belief the Jones's are home. What we have here is a belief due to a reason (or reasons), but not due to a reasoning process. According to Audi, there is an argument that underlies this case, in the sense of "an abstract argumental structure", and one that is probably enthymematic, from the grounding reason (or reasons) r to the target belief b. Believing for a reason in such an instance is structurally inferential. On the other hand, b may arise from a tokening or internal recitation of that structure by actually inferring b from r. Such a belief would be episodically inferential. Although every belief for a reason that is episodically inferential is structurally inferential, the converse does not hold.

It might be argued, though, that what we have here are merely descriptions of widely realized circumstances in which belief in God is formed. As already mentioned, Plantinga (drawing on the Scottish commonsense philosopher Thomas Reid) has argued that Calvin can be read as holding that we are designed in such a way that we have an innate disposition (the sensus divinitatis) to form beliefs about God under certain circumstances, such as those laid out by Calvin in the above passage. But then belief in God is based on the grounds of experience, not other beliefs or reasons, and hence the belief is immediate not mediate. However, I would argue in response to this increasingly prevalent interpretation of Calvin that, despite its philosophical plausibility, it is--as an interpretation of Calvin--somewhat misleading. Calvin means to distinguish, not merely two elements involved in a single mode of theistic belief formation, but two distinct modes in which man possesses a natural knowledge of God. Note the contrast Calvin makes: "He [God] has not only [non solum] sowed in men's minds that seed of religion. . .but [sed] revealed himself and daily discloses himself in the whole workmanship of the universe" (I. v. 1). Moreover, Calvin is quite emphatic about the "sense of divinity. . .engraved upon men's minds" (I. iii. 3) as constituting knowledge of God. The sensus divinitatis is not a mere disposition or belief-forming mechanism that is innate, but the knowledge itself is innate.¹³

This, of course, suggests that the innumerable external evidences are not merely experiential conditions which trigger the sensus divinitatis (as a theistic belief-forming mechanism) and yield a theistic belief, but function as an experiential basis for the formation of beliefs which in turn become reasons for believing the relevant theistic proposition. It might be thought, though, that even if the sensus divinitatis refers to an innate knowledge of God, the mode currently under consideration may be taken in Reidian sense. We account for theistic belief solely in terms of the experiential conditions, without adding the step of the believer's forming a belief that is then used as the ground for theistic belief. So really Calvin has in view two immediate modes, one innate and the other based on experiential conditions.¹⁴ This obviously depends on how one takes Calvin's claims in chapter 5, and the history of debate on the interpretation of that chapter shows that this is no easy matter to decide. However, I would favour the view that Calvin is not merely saying that there are experiential indications of God on the basis of which people believe, but that people believe in God having taken into account (entertaining the belief) that these things presented to them in sensory experience are in fact indications of God's existence. Much of Calvin's discussion does introduce the idea that people do in fact recognize the evidences in question to be signs or indications of God's existence and nature. "They are compelled to know--whether they will or not--that these are the signs of divinity. . ." (I. v. 4). Elsewhere, after adducing various evidences of God's providential control in the world, Calvin speaks of such evidences as a common way of seeking God if we but "trace the outlines that above and below sketch a living likeness of him" (I. v. 6). Moreover, many of Calvin's examples of symmetry and order in the world refer to facts uncovered through scientific means, which are then used as evidences for the existence of a Designer. In all these cases, I suggest that it is most plausible to take Calvin to be emphasizing the fact that many things we come to believe about the world (that are evident to the senses or uncovered through more careful observation or some degree of reasoning) play a role in grounding theistic belief. And if we recall the distinction between episodically and structurally inferential beliefs, we need not show that Calvin has actual arguments in mind, only that people come to believe things about God based on other things they believe about the world and the fact that they take such things to be evidence of God (in however an unsophisticated sense).

Calvin even recognizes the need to carry on argumentation at a more sophisticated level. This can be seen if we compare the previous account with Calvin's discussion of Paul at Athens before the Stoics and Epicureans, where he claims that Paul "showed by arguments from nature who God is, what he is like, and how He is to be worshipped properly."¹⁶ And again, "Moreover, because he is dealing in debate with profane men, he takes his proof from nature itself, for he would have wasted his time in contending with them by citing Scriptural texts."¹⁷

Interestingly enough, Calvin explicitly introduces the topic of arguments in relation to the knowledge of God as redeemer which comes to us through God's Word--the Holy Scriptures.¹⁹ Calvin notes that "since for unbelieving men religion seems to stand by opinion alone, they, in order not believe anything foolishly or lightly, both wish and demand rational proof that Moses and the Prophets spoke divinely" (I. vii. 4). But the prophets and apostles, Calvin tells us, "do not dwell on rational proofs," and according to Calvin, "we ought to seek our conviction in a higher place than human reasons, judgments, or conjectures, that is, in the secret testimony of the Spirit" (I. vii. 4). "The testimony of the Spirit is more excellent than all reason," explains Calvin. The basic problem as Calvin sees it is that faith in Scripture as God's Word requires certainty, but no argument or rational proof can establish with certainty that the Scriptures are the very Word of God. "The certainty it deserves with us, it attains by the testimony of the Spirit" (I. vii. 5). Calvin seems to think of the testimony of the Holy Spirit as an actual source of belief and one that is superior to inference or argument since it produces beliefs with a greater degree of strength or conviction. No argument can produce such a firm conviction; therefore, no one should believe on the basis of argument that Scripture is the Word of God. Consider Calvin's following statement: "Scripture will ultimately suffice for a saving knowledge of God only when it certainty is founded upon the inward persuasion of the Holy Spirit. . . .But those who wish to prove to unbelievers that Scripture is the Word of God are acting foolishly, for only by faith can this be known" (I. ix. 13).

This is a most illuminating argument, as it sheds light on a most plausible role for natural theology which unfortunately has been obscured since the Enlightenment. In the modern period, when theologians and philosophers have thought of natural theology it has usually been natural theology construed as apologetic, and this has been true in the Reformed tradition as well.²⁰ And this has often been conjoined with the assumption that unless one has reasons for belief in God, such a belief is irrational--something which Calvin and the Reformed tradition have consistently denied. But natural theology was not always so narrowly construed. In medieval theology it was often part of an intra-faith project of faith seeking understanding. We can call this consequent natural theology--a natural theology which presupposes a faith context. This is quite evident in St. Anselm who wrote both the Monologion and Proslogion, in which arguments for the existence of God were undertaken, in the context of life in a monastic community. And as Anselm himself made clear, the Monologion was an example of "meditation on the grounds of faith" and in the Proslogion Anselm sought a demonstration of the existence of God in order to understand the truth which his heart believed and loved. What one is impressed with here is how the project of reasoning about the existence and nature of God is directed towards Christians. In Cur Deus Homo?, Anselm says that the proofs he is about to set forth (for the necessity of the incarnation) are "not for the sake of attaining to faith by means of reason," but that believers "may be gladdened by understanding and meditating on those things which they believe, and that, as far as possible, they may always be ready to convince any one [presumably Jews and Moslems] who demands them a reason of that hope which is in us" (Book 1, Chapter 1).²¹ Even here, though an apologetic purpose is mentioned,²² one is struck with the emphasis on the intra- faith relevance of arguments and proofs by which what one first believes by faith is then demonstrated by reason, independent of the authority of Scripture.

But how precisely should we conceive of such arguments, for Scripture or for God, as "useful aids"? useful for what? what type of confirmation? Calvin is admittedly vague on the meaning of "confirmation", though his language is often similar to Anselm's, for instance when Calvin states the purpose of such evidences as a means whereby (a) "the dignity and majesty of Scripture are affirmed in godly hearts" and (b) Scripture is "brilliantly vindicated against the whiles of its disparagers". Although Calvin here suggests an apologetic purpose, I would highlight the intra-faith emphasis that characterizes his discussion. Calvin also seems taken by the aesthetic aspect of the Scriptures (as well as nature), in much the same way that Anselm spoke of his proofs as "attractive for the value and beauty of the reasoning."²³ But Calvin is a bit vague about what is actually achieved for the Christian (beyond the aesthetics) by considering such evidences.

However, I would like to suggest another, though closely related, way to conceive of the place of episodically inferential natural theology for the believer which introduces a plausible way to understand fides quaerens intellectum. The life of faith is governed by many aims. Some of these aims are cognitive. The Christian should not only have such specific aims as increasing in her understanding of Scripture, but more general epistemic aims such as increasing her stock of true beliefs and minimizing false ones. There is also the goal of what I will call reflective rationality, which consists in coming to have rational beliefs about the epistemic status of one's beliefs. In the present case, this translates into the desideratum of acquiring rational beliefs about the epistemic status of one's belief in God, that it is justified, warranted, or constitutes knowledge. It is generally thought to be a good thing (from a cognitive point of view) to arrive at sound judgments about the epistemic status of our beliefs. By thinking over reasons for believing in God, and evaluating the adequacy of such reasons, the Christian begins to form rational beliefs, not in God (that can be had without argument), but in the rational status of his belief in God.²⁵ Here faith moves toward an understanding of the rational grounds for theistic belief--toward the higher- level proposition that belief in God is rational. Such beliefs would be good confirmations of a faith Christians have received immediately from God.²⁶ So it seems that another function of an episodically inferential natural theology could be that of a consequent natural theology in which Christians meditate on the grounds for belief in the rationality of theistic belief. This higher-level, intra-faith function of theistic arguments seems quite compatible with Calvin's position on the immediate knowledge of God.

In this paper I have made an attempt to canvass two important considerations which bear on the plausibility of a mediate natural theology in John Calvin: (a) the nature of inferential knowledge and (b) the intra-faith function of natural theology. I have argued that there are good grounds for holding that there is at least implicit in Calvin a structurally inferential natural theology, and that even an episodically inferential natural theology would be compatible with salient features of the reformer's theology. Moreover, the latter contention is supported by Calvin's commitment (even if tepid) to evidences as "confirmations" for the believer. This, I believe, provides an apt context for developing a function for natural theology within the context of faith, a calvinistic conception of faith seeking understanding. Perhaps arguments for the existence of God can strengthen the warrant of theistic belief for some people, or maybe such arguments can make a significant contribution toward satisfying the cognitive goal of reflective rationality with respect to belief in God.²⁷