The creature is an effect of God. If an effect is better known to us than it's
cause, we can learn something about the cause by its effect; for effects
resemble their causes. Resemblance or likeness is a sharing in the same form.
"Every agent insofar as it is an agent produces an effect similar to itself (for
an agent works according to its form)" (Leo Elders, The Philosophical
Theology of Thomas Aquinas, p. 164). So, at the very least, from an effect we
learn that a cause must exist. Hence, through God's effects (things as they
exists in the world) we can come to learn that God exists as the cause of them.
The likeness of the creature to God will be a remote likeness, though, because
though there is a sharing in form between God and creatures, they do not have
the same form according to the same content (ratio). Moreover, since effects
are not proportionate to their causes, what we know of God by his effects is
imperfect. What God is remains unknown (whether through revelation or reason)--Aquinas's principle of agnosticism (rooted in the influence of Denys).
Way of causality leads us to see "the surpassing perfection of God who is the
cause of all things, and to acknowledge the finitude and imperfection which
belongs to creatures and to our human knowledge which is derived from
creatures." (p. 195)
How do we learn more about God?
(1) We deny of him whatever imperfection we in the creatures
(2) We affirm of him in a supereminent way whatever perfection we recognize
in creatures.
In other terms we will gain not a knowledge of what God is, but of what he
is not (1)--via negativa. And we will perceive that his perfection is somehow
above all that we know (2)--via eminentiae.
B. The Way of Remotion (via remotionis)/Way of negation (via negationis): there
is a knowledge of God derived from removing the "imperfections" of the
perfections of the creature.
The way of remotion or via negationis (way of negation) denies of God the
imperfections found in the creature. It aims to state, not what God is, but
rather what he is not. "De Deo scire non possumus quid sit, sed quid non sit."
Thomas says:
"Having recognized that a certain thing exists, we still have to investigate the way in which it exists, that we may come to understand what it is that exists. Now we cannot know what God is, but only what he is not; we must therefore consider the ways in which God does not exist, rather than the ways in which he does." (ST, Ia. 2)
This method safeguards "God's transcendence" and indicates the "limits of our
knowledge" (sense perception).
Since the creature is an effect of God and therefore resembles (even if
remotely) the Creator by containing some of his perfections, we may come to
understand something of the nature of God by predicating of Him those
perfections first discovered to be in the creature (we know the effects better
than the cause). God's transcendent perfection is recognized by affirming of
him all the perfections of the creature in a supereminent way. We do not come to know God as he is in himself, but we are not wholly ignorant about him either. As the creator he must transcend all creatures, but
since we are his effects whatever perfections be found in us (how be it
imperfectly) must be in him in the highest degree, for the effects resemble their
causes as an outflowing from them.
All 3 ways are crucial:
(1) Via Causalitatis: metaphysical foundation
(2) Via Negationis: preserves the Creator-creature distinction
(3) Via Eminentiae: attributes properly predicated of God
II. GOD, LANGUAGE, AND THE 3 WAYS
A. The Relationship between knowledge and talk about God.
The ways of causality, negation, and eminence are all operational in talk about
God.
According to Aquinas all our talk about God is analogical, since when we talk
about God we predicate things of him in a manner similar to the way in which
we predicate them of creatures. A consequence of the via negationis is that talk
about God is not univocal--words used of God will not have the same meaning
as they do when used of creatures. But the way of causality (and the principle
that effects resemble their causes) entails that talk about God will not be
equivocal. Words used of God will not have a different meaning than the
meaning they have when used of creatures. Therefore, Aquinas makes several
positive statements about God after the way of analogy: God is cause, eternal,
perfect, good, everywhere present, etc. "The ground for their analogous usage is the resemblance of creatures to God which is itself the result of God's creative causality." (p. 197)
Consider: "God is good"
(1) Causality: God is the ultimate cause of goodness in his creatures.
(2) Negation: God is not evil and not good in a limited fashion as are we.
(3) Eminence: God is good in a surpassing way.
Although all 3 are involved in every statement about God, some statements are
grounded in one more than the others.
(a) God is creator - (1)
(b) God is immaterial - (2)
(c) God is good - (3)
In (3) things are predicated of God substantially (though analogically), either proper predication or metaphorical predication.
1. The univocal use of a term involves a convergence of the modus
significandi (the mode of signification) and res significata (the thing signified);
e.g., the grass is green - the house is green. Here "greeness" is the same
predicated of two different things in the same sense.
2. The equivocal use of a term involves a divergence of the modus
significandi and the res significata; e.g., John is boiling - the water is boiling.
Here what is signified by "boiling" in the two sentences is different as is the
mode in which it is true of each subject.
3. The analogical use of a term involves a divergence of the modus
significandi and a convergence of the res significata; i.e., God is good - John
is good. Here the same thing "goodness" holds true of two subjects, though the
manner in which it is true of each is different. Another example: faithfulness.
"The dog is faithful to his master" and "the man is faithful to his wife".
Faithfulness is each case is exemplified in different ways. The faithfulness of
a dog is one thing, the faithfulness of a husband is another--both are instances
of faithfulness. Faithfulness will be exhibited in different ways depending on
whom it is that is faithful.
Thomas writes "We have to consider two things...in the words we use to attribute perfections to God, firstly the
perfections themselves that are signified--goodness, life, and the like--and secondly the way in
which they are signified." (1a. 13. 3).
Divine simplicity precludes univocal predication of God, since all univocal
predication entails that the subject can be differentiated by genus and species
(scientific classification), but this is not true of God as the First Existent.
Immutability is established in the actual proofs for the existence of God.
ARGUMENT FROM MOTION
(P1) Some things in the world are moved (observable fact)
(P2) Everything that is moved is moved by another.
(P3) There is no procession of movers to infinity.
(C) Therefore, there is a first mover which is moved by no other.
(P1) is taken as evident, but (P2) and (P3) are argued for.
Argument for (P2): from the analysis of motion in terms of potency and act.
(a) A thing is moved only if it is in potency to that toward which it is moved.
(b) A thing moves = df. a thing is in act (to move is to reduce X from potency to
act.
(c) Nothing can be reduced from potency to act except by some being in act.
It follows from (a)-(c) that (i) a thing cannot move itself and
(ii) A thing cannot be both mover and moved according to the same respect and
in the same way.
and
(d) if either (i) or (ii), then a thing would be in potency and in act at the same
time and in the same respect.
so,
(P2) Therefore, omne quod movetur ab alio movetur.
Argument for (P3):
(a) If there is an endless series of movers, then every change in a series of
connected changes depends on a prior changer.
(b) If every change in a series of connected changes depends on a prior changer,
then the whole series of changing things is only derivatively an initiator of
change.
(c) If the whole series of changing things is only derivatively an initiator of
change, then the whole series of things being changed requires something to
initiate its change.
(d) If there is an endless series of movers, then the whole series of things being
changed requires something to initiate its change.
Conclusion: There is a first mover which is moved by no other (and this first mover must
be immutable).
Point of the 5 Ways:
By the 5 ways we come to see God as the ultimate efficient, exemplar, and final cause of all things. If God is, or could be changed, he could not be the first cause. But the point of the five ways is that we are led from observation (of motion, of causality, etc.) to postulate something beyond observation as an explanation for what we observe. The explanation ultimately requires that we terminate chains of motion and change with a being for whom causal questions do not arise. If God is changeable, then he cannot be the ultimate explanation for the universe.
Videtur quod Deus non sit omnino immutabilis. . . . Sed contra. . . Ego Deus et non mutor (Mal. 3:6).
WAY OF CAUSALITY: God as the source of the being of the creature.
Existence of the world-------------------------> Existence of God
We need another method, for thought the creature is similar to God, God is not
like the creature. Must go beyond pure causality.
WAY OF NEGATION
Existence of God ------------------------------> Nature of God
(Fact of God's existence)----------------------> In what way God does not exist.
Existence of things----------------------------> Nature of things
(Fact of X's existence)------------------------> Manner of X's existing
"...the way of negation is necessary as a corrective through which properties and qualities, as they exist in creatures, are derived from God. For things, as they exist in creatures are always imperfect. The nature of God's causality also indicates, however, that these things which exist imperfectly in the creature must somehow exist in a surpassing way in God." (p. 144)
The way of negation is closely related to the WAY OF EMINENCE.
3 WAYS OF ESTABLISHING IMMUTABILITY
Argument 1:
(1) God, as first being, is pure act.
(2) To be moved is to be in passive potency.
(3) Whatever is pure act can have no passive potency.
(4) Therefore, God cannot be moved.
Argument 2:
(1) Everything moved is composite.
(2) God is wholly simple.
(3) Therefore, God cannot be moved.
To prove (1): (a) In every changing thing, something persists and something passes.
Argument 3:
(1) Everything moved acquires something (by its being moved) not previously
possessed.
(2) God is infinite (embracing in himself the whole fullness of perfection of all
existence).
(3) An infinite being can acquire nothing.
(4) Therefore, God cannot be moved.
Arguments (1)-(3) refer to the 4th of the 5 ways--God's perfection.
1. "I am God and I am not changed" (Mal. 3:6)
2. "...with Whom there is no change nor shadow of turning" (Jas. 1:17)
3. Others: Num. 23:19, Psalm 101:28
Christian faith establishes the unchanging and transcendent God of Christian
revelation, the source of all being, creator of all things.
Faith/Revelation----------------------------------------> God as efficient Cause
1. Absolute simplicity------------------(composite character of all created beings)
2. Ultimate perfection------------------(creaturely imperfection)
3. Pure actuality-----------------------(potency and act relation)
4. Primary transcendent causality-------(dependence of creatures on creator)
Greek Philosophy establishes immovable first mover (divine principle), source
of the motion of all other things, moving all things as their final cause.
Reason---------------------------------------------------> God as Final Cause
V. AQUINAS AND ARISTOTLE DISTINGUISHED ON THE FIRST MOVER
A. Aquinas and Aristotle on the potency/act Distinction
Aristotle: Potency (prime matter, unlimited) is determined by act (substantial form)
Act (substantial form) is a determining principle.
Aquinas: Act (esse) is specified and limited by potency (essence).
Act (esse) is, itself, an unlimited principle.
Both Aquinas and Aristotle hold that there is a being which is PURE ACT and
exists apart from all potency. For Aquinas the Actus Purus is boundless perfection of pure esse. For Aristotle the Actus Purus is a determinate perfection of substantial form. Aquinas's insight: Essence and existence (as to potency and act) God is his own existence-ipsum esse subsistens (existence and essence are one) Taken from Avicenna. Aquinas understands the potency and act relation to be the relation of essence and existence (matter and form).
Christian doctrine of creation combined with Platonic notion of participation.
Aristotle: (1) The immovable mover is the final cause of motion
Aquinas: (2) Immovable mover is the efficient cause off the world, existence--esse
(1) only moves the outermost sphere of the universe by being the object
desired by the soul of that sphere, whereas (2) is the creator of all that exists.
Efficient cause strengthens concept of God as final cause, for the efficient
cause is desirable or good with respect to its effect. "As final cause, therefore, God moves the universe not simply as the object desired by the soul of
the outermost sphere, but as the Being who is universally desired and loved by all creatures, each according to its own capacity of nature and grace." (p. 190)
VI. MISTAKES REGARDING DIVINE IMMUTABILITY
To understand immutability to be a positive description of the divine nature.
This clearly confounds the imperfect immutability possessed by creatures with
God's perfect immutability. (1) God is unconcerned and indifferent, (2) God is loveless beloved--wholly unaffected, detached ,(3) Rigid immutability of a loveless monster, (4) Static, cold, immobile, passionless, and totally devoid of life and love. "Far from attributing the imperfect immutability of creatures to God in a positive way, Thomas here intends to make no positive statement whatever about the divine nature. He intends to make only a negative statement, and he makes that statement precisely to deny that creaturely imperfection may be found in God." (p. 212-13)
Immutability in the creatures is mixed with imperfection, and is properly
viewed as a lack of actuality (rest, quies). Immutability in God will reflect the positive aspects of immutability in the creature (but none of the imperfections): steadfastness, fidelity (in marriage), stability of character, steadfastness in virtue. The reason why mutability is desirable in the creature is because the creature is perfectible and hence change can be for the better, to achieve what was not possessed before. Change in the modern world is quite powerful--progress, development, growth are all thought of as values. "It is only when the creature is considered as not yet perfect that motion and change are judged
desirable for it. For it is through such notion that the creature will attain the perfection it lacks." (p. 217) Immutability implies lack of progress---common notion/Change implies growth in perfection-----common notion.
Philosophy of existentialism: Human existence with all its particular structures and limits becomes the measure of reality. In theology, God is conceived of as himself subject to that particular sort of existence which is characteristic of human beings.
Process Theology: Tends to confine God within the limits of human concepts--way of eminence without negation. All creaturely attributes are predicated of God.
VII. God's Motion and the Relationship between God and the Creature
A. Preliminary Consideration
God may be said to be in motion in three senses:
1. Immanent action of knowing and willing (active potency)
2. Divine causality as a sort of motion (active potency)
3. Metaphorical uses of "motion" (active potency)
B. The Nature of Relations
The relationship between God and creation is different from the relationship
between the creatures.
Relations involve (a) Two terms of extremes and (b) A reference of one to the
other, and where they are distinguished by the way that relation is in each of
them. Relations may be in each of the terms in two different ways: (c) really
or (d) ideally.
1. A relation may exist in idea with respect to both its terms. (e.g., identity--a
thing is the same as itself)
2. A relation may really exist in each of its terms. (e.g., great and small,
double and half--quantity cases. The relation exists because of some reality
belonging to both terms.
3. A relation may be in one extreme in reality, but in another extreme in idea
only. These are things are two different orders. (e.g., a.knowledge /b.knowable
object. The relationship is real with respect knowledge, for a. truly has
reference to b.. But b. is itself outside the intentional order, and b. therefore
has no real relationship to a. These are MIXED RELATIONS.
C. Relations involving God and Creatures
Transient actions of creatures = agent in some way imparts actuality to its
effect and thus produces some likeness of itself. The action of the agent passes
from agent to effect.
1. Divine creative act is in some ways similarly to creaturely transient action,
for God imparts a sharing in his goodness and actuality, thereby causing a
creature which is in some way like himself to exist. In created acts, though, the
act of the agent is distinct from its form and there is a real relationship
between the agent and the effect. Divine acts are not distinct from their form
and there is no common order of motion between agent and effect, hence there
is no real relationship between God and the creatures.
2. In divine acts (such as in creation) the real relation is in the creature, but in
God it is a relation of reason or idea. Hence, God has no real relations with the
creature. It does not follow that (a) the is no relationship at all between God
and creatures and (b) God is remote from the creatures.
MIXED RELATIONS = Df. a relation in which two things are related to each
other in such a way that one depends upon the other, but the other does not
depend upon it. In the dependent member, the relation is real. In the
independent member, the relation is merely one of reason.
VIII. GOD'S CREATIVE ACT AND DIVINE IMMUTABILITY
A. Freedom and Necessity in divine act of willing the creatures
In one (timeless and immutable) act of will, God necessarily wills his own
goodness as an end and freely wills creatures as ordered to that end as
participants in his goodness. Hence, the end (out of absolute necessity) and the
means to that end (out of freedom) form one single act of will.
God wills his own goodness (as the proper object of his will) out of absolute
necessity.
2. God freely wills things apart from himself insofar as they are ordered to that
end.
3. If and only if the creatures are required for God's willing his own goodness
does God not freely will the existence of creatures.
(a) If X is necessary for E, and S wills E necessarily, then S wills
X necessarily.
(b) If X is not necessary for E, and S wills E necessarily, then S
does not necessarily will X necessarily.
So God may will his own goodness out of necessity, but since the existence of
creatures as ordered to that end (as a means to that end) is not required for the
attainment of the end, God freely wills that creatures exist and participate in
God's goodness.
B. Consequences of creation as a free act
If God freely creates the world, it is possible that he might not have created
the world, for a free act is an act which an agent can do or not do.
1. Can God will other things than which he wills?
God's creative act is not subject to absolute necessity, though
it is subject to necessity of supposition for it is necessary that
if God wills the existence of his creatures, he cannot not will
their existence. So it is possible, absolutely speaking, for God
to have created a different order than the one he actually did.
2. Would God be different than he is if he had created a different order?
First, the question may be inappropriate as a counterfactual.
Secondly, it must be admitted (Dodd's view) that if God had
willed differently, he would have been different in some way.
It is possible to distinguish in the one act of will (whereby God wills his own
goodness and the participation of his goodness by creatures):
(a) a relation of the divine will to itself--natural
(b) a relation of the divine will to other things--free
As free implies no difference vis the divine essence by its absence, the absence
of the act as it is directed toward the existence of creatures implies no
difference in the divine essence, but a difference only in that toward which it
is directed--creatures. A consequence of mixed relations. If God is not really
related to the creatures, then had he not willed them he would not have been
different, for if it made him different, there would have been a real relation.
The difference lies in the creature, which is really related to God. If God has
created a different world, the world would have been different, for a different
contingent state of affairs would have been related to God. But God remains
invariant under the actualization of these different possibilities.
"If the act by which God wills his own goodness were not directed towards or terminated in the existence of a given creature, there would be no difference in the act with regard to the divin essence, but only with regard to that creature in which the act is terminated." (p. 254-55)
C. Alleged difficulties with a timeless immutable God creating a contingent world
1. God cannot act in time unless he is temporal or mutable.
God timeless wills that X be brought about in time according to
order of secondary causes, where some of these are contingent
in nature. We must distinguish between S bringing about X at
time t and S bringing it about that X happen at time t. God may
unchanging will the whole temporal matrix and will that within
it things come to pass contingently.
2. If God is immutable, he cannot act upon changeable creatures without
imposing a sort of necessity upon them and hence depriving them of their
contingency and freedom.
God, being the source of all necessity and contingency, is not
another cause in the causal nexus of the world. There is an
important distinction between the transcendent causality of God
and the causality proper to creatures. God's causality is
exercised timelessly by bringing about things in the world either
by necessity or by contingency (through secondary causes).
God's omnipotence assures that he is able to bring these things
about.
"For, as the ultimate and transcendent cause of things, he acts sometimes
through necessary causes which produce necessary effects, and sometimes
through contingent causes which produce contingent effects. Thus both
necessary and contingent effects proceed from the unchanging God." (p. 266)
Both contingency and necessity in the world are dependent on
the causal power of God. In other words, God wills that some
things should happen contingently in the world (in which effects
are not present in their causes) and that some things should
happen out of necessity (in which effects are present in their
causes). Since the more efficacious an agent is, the more the
agent determines the effect. God's power makes it possible for
him to bring about things according to their proper modality.
"His causal power is so great that he produces his effects according to the particular modalities and adopts them to the nature of the creatures in which he works, and also to man's free will" (Elders, p. ).