According to the syllabus there were three general goals for the course.

1. To understand and critically reflect on the ideas and arguments found in central texts in religious epistemology.

A. We examined a broad range of authors (religious and non-religious) from the medieval period to contemporary philosophy who have made important contributions to religious epistemology.

1. Thomas Aquinas: logical demonstrations for God's existence based on Aristotle, division of religious beliefs into preambles of faith (which can be proved by reason) and the articles of faith (which cannot be proved by reason), and clarifying the role of reason with respect to the articles of faith.

2. John Calvin: affirmation of a universal awareness of God and manifestation of God in the created order, articulation of the epistemological effects of sin, role of the Holy Spirit or religious experience in grounding religious beliefs.

3. John Locke and W.K. Clifford: the epistemology of classical foundationalism, deontologism, and evidentialism originating in the Enlightenment, and the evidentialist objection to religious belief: religious belief is rational only if there is adequate evidence in support of it, but there is no adequate evidence for religious beliefs.

4. Sigmund Freud and Karl Marx: the articulation of an epistemic objection to theism distinct from the deontological/evidentialist objection, namely that religious belief is either the result of cognitive malfunction (Marx) or non truth-aimed cognitive faculties (Freud), hence religious belief lacks warrant.

5. Alvin Plantinga: presented an exposition and critique of both evidentialism and the Marx/Freud objection. The evidentialist objection is inadequate since (a) it is based on classical foundationalism, which is an implausible epistemological theory and (b) a person can be within their intellectual rights in believing in God even if the person has no evidence or argument for his belief in God. The Freud and Marx objection carries force only if one assumes at the outset that there is no God. But epistemic objections to theism are supposed to be independent of objections to the truth of theistic belief. Plantinga shows how epistemological questions rest on metaphysical foundations.

6. Paley, Hume, and Darwin: Paley presented an important modern contribution to arguments for God's existence, inspired by developments in science. Paley's argument from design, anticipated in Aquinas, argues that the existence of complex living organisms is very good evidence for God since it is evidence for a grand designer. Hume and Darwin each present objections to Paley's design argument. Hume thinks that it is a very weak argument from analogy. Darwin's theory of biological evolution allows for an alternative explanation for the existence of living organisms.

7. William Craig, Stephan Hawking, Keith Ward: each presents arguments relevant for assessing cosmological arguments for God's existence. Craig presented an argument for God's existence based on Big Bang cosmology (the kalam cosmological argument), whereas Ward argues that, whether the Universe has a beginning or not, one must still explain why the Universe exists at all (non-kalam cosmological argument). Hawking, a contemporary cosmologist, argues that Big Bang cosmology does not support any argument for God's existence. Ward argues that Hawking's argument is not applicable to non-Kalam cosmological arguments.

8. John Leslie and Richard Swinburne: Each presents further considerations relevant to reasoning to God's existence, especially based on the facts of temporal regularities and the fine-tuning of the Universe. Swinburne's argument is significant since he draws on multiple bits of evidence to present a cumulative case for God's existence employing a rigorous model of inference to best explanation.

9. Pope John Paul II's Fides et Ratio emphasized the unity of faith and reason over against the tendencies in modernity to choose a faith without reason or reason without faith. The encyclical urges a Christian appreciation of reason, not merely for defending the faith in apologetics, but with respect to reason as an original endowment by God and a source for reflecting on one's faith commitments. He also develops the role of faith in enabling reason to arrive at truths that are otherwise obscured to the mind with the enlightenment of faith.

B. We examined the arguments of these thinkers and concluded (if only tentatively):

1. Aquinas and Calvin appear to be offering very distinct ways of thinking about how it is that we know God, but in fact their positions may be quite compatible. E.g., An intuitive or experiential grasp of God's existence is not inconsistent with knowing truths about God inferentially. As for Aquinas' arguments for God's existence, they provide good examples of attempts to utilize the generally accepted philosophical framework of the times to establish some religious beliefs by human reason. To the extent to which they depend on that framework (e.g., Aristotelian philosophy), they may lose their force for contemporary philosophers.

2. The evidentialist requirement to religious belief does seem implausible, as Plantinga points out, if based on classical foundationalism. However, there are various ways of reworking the requirement itself and its broader epistemological framework, so that it is not subject to the objections that Plantinga presents.

3. Plantinga also seems correct in his objections to the Freud and Marx objections. These are examples of naturalistic explanations of why people hold religious beliefs. But these explanations, and their corresponding epistemic objection, presuppose that theism is not true; otherwise they lose their force as arguments. But the de iure question regarding theistic belief is supposed to be distinct from the de facto question.

4. Although he evidentialist objection to religious belief may be mistaken if the evidentialist requirement is false, it will also be mistaken if there is adequate evidence for God's existence. We have examined several arguments for God's existence in modern and contemporary philosophy, as well as their relation to both philosophy and science. None of the arguments we looked at look like they will be successful as valid deductive argument, proceeding from undeniable premises. But then again, few arguments achieve such lofty goals. Hence, we have attempted to view theistic arguments as probabilistic arguments, following the structure of inference to best explanation. Although the scientific views in modern philosophy have often created difficulties for such theistic arguments, I have suggested that a different attitude is called for in contemporary philosophy. Developments in both science and philosophy have strengthened the prospects for reasoning to God's existence. Although these arguments may not be rationally compelling, they certainly present a prima facie challenge to the evidentialist objection to religious belief.

5. Although it is common to show favoritism toward a particular mode of knowing God, given the broad range of religious beliefs it is likely that various modes play different but mutually supportive roles in generating and sustaining religious beliefs. Hence, theistic arguments may be viewed as a codifying and development of an experiential or intuitive sense of God that many have in their experience of the world.

2. On the basis of (1), to understand some basic questions and problems in religious epistemology.

1. We have examined at last four distinct questions here

1. Are there any religious beliefs that can be arrived at by human reason, and hence do not require a supernatural source or the exercise of faith as a supernatural gift?

2. Does the rationality or epistemic respectability of religious belief require evidence?

3. Are there any good arguments for God's existence?

4. How should we relate faith and reason?

2. Some tentative conclusions:

1. What is a rational belief? What is required to have a rational belief? We looked at internalist and externalist understandings of rational belief. Throughout the course we have returned to these distinctions to assess whether religious beliefs in general or certain ones in particular are rational or irrational. We often noted how deeper philosophical assumptions often dictate the application of these epistemological categories to religious belief. Hence, we have fulfilled two important philosophical goals: to clear as possible about concepts and to discover and understand presuppositions.
2. What is required to have knowledge? Here we examined several problems related to the conditions of knowledge. For instance, we noted that Gettier cases entail that knowledge, unlike a mere true belief, not be an accidentally true belief. The idea of "grounds" that are "truth indicating" emerged as an important factor in distinguishing knowledge from true belief. Once again, how such distinctions are applied to religious belief often depends on distinctly metaphysical matters. What this suggests is that, though we can examine epistemological questions, we cannot divorce them entirely from metaphysical questions. The conflict between theism and metaphysical naturalism then is of great consequence for how we answer many of these questions in the epistemology of religious belief. The stance one takes on these fundamentally opposed metaphysical views will have great impact on one's epistemology of religious belief.